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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Third
District Court, and the appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this
Court. (Order Transferring Appeal, R. 1080-81.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, dismissing

Plaintiff/Appellant Albert Sandberg's legal malpractice claim against Defendant/Appellee Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, L.C., on the ground that the claim that Defendant
neglected to file, a personal injury claim against Salt Lake City, would have been
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act's discretionary function exception.
(Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Memorandum for Summary Judgment, R. 8921007 (hereafter "Oppo. Mem.").)
This issue involves two sub-issues:
a.

Whether the trial court erred in holding that the discretionary func-

tion exception of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) would have applied to the claim
against the City that Defendant failed to bring on Mr. Sandberg's behalf. (Oppo.
Mem.,R. 905-14.)
b.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to hold that barring Mr.

Sandberg's claim against the City under the Act would have violated article I, section
11 of the Utah Constitution. (Oppo. Mem., R. 914-17.)
1

Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences
are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Mr. Sandberg), and no
deference is given to the trial court's ruling. E.g., Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell.
966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Badger v. Brooklvn Canal Co.. 922 P.2d 745, 748
(Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Const, art. L 8 11:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in
his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and
no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9:
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition
of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public
improvement.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out
of, in connection with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused . . . .
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a legal malpractice claim by Mr. Sandberg against Defendant, Mr. Sandberg's former counsel, for failing to timely file Mr. Sandberg's personal injury claim
against Salt Lake City. Mr. Sandberg was injured when he fell into an unguarded fivefoot-deep concrete pit while using the Salt Lake Valley Landfill, and he retained Defendant to represent him. Defendant sued Salt Lake County and received a $100,000
settlement, but Defendant neglected to file a claim against Salt Lake City, which
designed and co-owned the Facility, and the time to file such a claim expired. Mr.
Sandberg asserts that the City was negligent in failing to have a safety chain or other
barrier along the edge of the pit and in maintaining a dangerously narrow sidewalk
along the pit.
Course of Proceedings.
Mr. Sandberg initiated this action on November 2, 2000, and demanded a jury
trial on November 22, the day after Defendant answered. (Complaint, R. 1-6; Answer,
R. 10-15; Jury Demand, R. 16-17.) On November 21, 2001, Defendant moved for
summary judgment. (Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 123-26.) A hearing on the
motion took place on January 10, 2002, at which the trial court verbally granted the
motion. (Hearing Transcript, R. 1083.) The order dismissing the claim was entered
on January 22, 2002. (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.
1072-74, Addendum Exhibit 1 hereto.) Mr. Sandberg's notice of appeal was filed
January 31, 2002. (Notice of Appeal, R. 1075-77.)
3

Statement of Facts
A.

Mr. Sandberg's Accident.

Plaintiff Albert Sandberg was severely injured on March 25, 1996, when he
slipped and fell into the Citizens' Unloading Facility (the "Facility") at the Salt Lake
Valley Solid Waste Facility (the "Landfill"). (Complaint 1 1, R. 1-2.) The Facility,
which opened in approximately 1991, featured a central pit, with access roads on both
sides, so that the Facility's users could drive up to the edge of the pit and dump their
nonhazardous wastes, which would then be pushed out of the pit by front-end loaders
and disposed of along with other waste dumped at the Landfill. (See Facility Diagram,
R. 643, Addendum Exhibit 3; Photographs, R. 931, Addendum Exhibit 4.) A six-footwide sidewalk separated the driving surface from the edge of the pit, which left very
little space for individuals to stand when unloading their vehicles, particularly when
tailgates were lowered.1 (Deposition of Bud Stanford, R. 940; Photographs; Expert
Report, R. 869.) The edge of the dumping pit was completely unguarded by barricades, chains, or other features, even though the edge had a potential fall of five feet
onto hard concrete. (Photographs; Expert Report.)
Not surprisingly, at least a dozen people were injured, some severely, by falling
into the pit between 1992 and March 1996. (Summary of Dumping Pit Injuries, R.
929.) Another three people were injured in the summer of 1996, after which the
sidewalk was widened to nine feet and a chain was installed to keep people from falling

1

When the Facility was built, the sidewalk was three feet wide; it was widened
to six feet sometime between 1991 and 1996. (Stanford Depo., R. 940.)
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into the pit.

(Injury Summary, R. 929; Stanford Depo., R. 937, 940-41, 951-52.)

Since then, not a single person has been significantly injured from falling into the pit.
(Stanford Depo., R. 947-48.) Accordingly, there is "no consideration . . . at all" to
removing the chain. (Stanford Depo., R. 949.)
When Mr. Sandberg arrived at the Facility on March 25, he backed his truck up
about a foot away from the curb, which left him less than two feet of room behind the
open tailgate on his truck. (Deposition of Albert Sandberg at 33, 37, R. 843-44.) Mr.
Sandberg was careful to avoid the edge, but his foot slipped on an icy patch of the
sidewalk as he stepped out of the truck, and he fell into the pit, first landing hard on his
feet and then hitting his head on the concrete floor. (Sandberg Depo. at 42-51, R. 84547.) Mr. Sandberg's left heel bone was shattered, his left ankle was broken, and the
cartilage in his right knee was destroyed. (Sandberg Depo. at 54-56, R. 848.) Mr.
Sandberg has undergone no less than five surgeries to treat the injuries he sustained that
day, including one procedure in which the ends of his toes were cut off and steel rods
inserted into his toes, and he will require a knee replacement in the future. (Sandberg
Depo. at 54-57, R. 848-49.)
B.

The Construction and Operation of the Facility.

The Salt Lake Valley Solid Waste Management Council (the Council), the governing body that operates the Landfill and the Facility, was created in 1980 pursuant to
an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement between Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County.
(Interlocal Cooperation Agreement, R. 162-70.)

The Council was made up of five

members, including officials from the City and the County. (Agreement 1 2, R. 163.)

5

The Council was expressly directed to "plan, establish, and approve all construction
and expansion projects for solid waste processing and disposal operations." (Agreement t 8(D), R. 165.) The Council was further directed to "determine broad matters
of policy" regarding the operation and management of waste disposal facilities, including "[r]eview[ing] and establish[ing] policy on all operations or activities that are major
in nature and require policy determinations." (Agreement t l 8(E), 8(E)(7), R. 165.)
In the late 1980s, the County Public Works Department commissioned reports
that recommended that a separate citizens' unloading/transfer station be added to the
existing facilities at the Landfill. (Affidavit of Bud Logan Stanford t 5, R. 195.)2 In
March 1990, the County Public Works Department formally recommended that such a
facility be built. (Id 1 6.) The engineering department of the Salt Lake City Public
Works Department was therefore hired to design the facility; Paul Jara, a civil
engineer, was in charge of the design. (IcL t l 11-12, R. 196.) Mr. Jara prepared a
Design Report and other plans and diagrams based on his review of other facilities,
consultation with an outside engineering firm (EMCON), and other factors. (Design
Report, R. 632-768.)
The decision to build the Facility with a narrow sidewalk and with no chain or
safety barrier along the edge of the open concrete pit was made primarily by Mr. Jara,
the engineer working for the City, and Mr. Bud Stanford, who worked for the County
Public Works Department, with no review or consideration by their superiors or other

2

Among other things, the purpose of the citizens' unloading facility was to allow
private citizens to dump their refuse at a different location than commercial haulers.
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governmental bodies. Plans for the Facility were circulated and reviewed by various
governmental and private actors, but these plans did not address whether chains or
other safety barriers would be installed along the edge of the open concrete pit, nor did
they specify how wide the sidewalk separating the pit from the driving surface would
be. (See, e.g.. Design Report, R. 632-768.) Nor did the plans discuss the pros and
cons of sidewalk widths or safety barriers. (See id.) Even the diagrams of the pit wall
included within the Design Report did not address sidewalk width or the existence or
nonexistence of safety barriers. (See id at R. 644-73.) To the contrary, the preliminary sketch of the Facility that was circulated to the review agencies appeared to show
a wall along the edge of the pit. (Facility Diagram, R. 643, Add. Ex. 3.)
Similarly, plans for the Facility were discussed at review meetings, but neither
safety chains nor sidewalk widths were addressed, neither the County Public Works
Department nor the Council asked about such safety features, and no decision was
made by the Public Works Department or the Council to omit such protective features.
(See Stanford Depo., R. 936, 938-40, 953.) Instead, the matter was discussed once, in
an informal conversation in the lunchroom after a meeting. Mr. Stanford later testified
that these issues were "minute to minute details" with which the Landfill Council did
not concern itself:
A.
. . . They [the Landfill Council] don't like to get into the
minute to minute details. They leave that to us.
Q.

Was this a minute to minute detail?

A.

These railings are, yeah. Something they don't get involved with.

7

(Stanford Depo., R. 942 (emphasis added).)
There was also no Council review of or involvement in the decision to widen the
sidewalks and install the safety chain after Mr. Sandberg and the three other persons
were injured in the spring and summer of 1996. In fact, the City was not involved in
that decision at all. Instead, Mr. Stanford, the operations manager at the Landfill, testified that "[w]e just did that on our own." (Stanford Depo., R. 941, 951-52.)
C.

The Litigation Against the City and the County.

In April 1996, Mr. Sandberg retained Gordon Jensen, of the Defendant law firm
to represent him in obtaining compensation for his injuries. (Complaint % 2, R. 1-2;
Sandberg Depo. at 96-100, R. 859-60.) Mr. Jensen filed a timely notice of claim on
Mr. Sandberg's behalf with Salt Lake County, and when that claim was denied Mr.
Jensen filed a complaint in Third District Court.

(Complaint t 4, R. 2; Sandberg

Depo. at 103, R. 860.) Unfortunately, Mr. Jensen never filed a notice of claim with
Salt Lake City, even though the City designed the Facility and co-owned and co-managed the Landfill with the County. (Complaint 11 5, 7, R. 2-3.)
Subsequently, Mr. Jensen died, and in the spring of 1999 Mr. Sandberg retained
Anderson & Karrenberg to continue the representation. (Complaint t 6, R. 2-3.) In
August 1999, Anderson & Karrenberg filed a notice of claim with Salt Lake City,
which was denied, and added the City as a defendant in the then-pending lawsuit
against the County. (Id.) The claim against the City was dismissed with prejudice,
however, for Mr. Sandberg's failure to comply with the notice of claim requirements of
the Governmental Immunity Act. (Id.) In September 2000, Mr. Sandberg settled his
8

claim against the County for $100,000. (IcL if 7, R. 3.) This amount represents less
than half of the damages Mr. Sandberg sustained from his injuries, but Mr. Sandberg
accepted the settlement because the County was seeking an allocation of fault to the
City, which had designed and co-owned the Facility, and more than fifty percent of the
fault would have likely been attributed to the City. Q± W 7-9, R. 3.) Thus, Mr.
Sandberg is still substantially uncompensated for the injuries he sustained as a result of
the City's negligent design and operation of the Facility. (Id^ 1f1 8-9, R. 3.)
D.

The Summary Judgment Proceedings Below.

Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that even if Defendant had
acted negligently in failing to timely file a notice of claim with the City, such negligence did not proximately cause Mr. Sandberg any injury because the claim would
have been barred under the discretionary function exception to the waivers of immunity
included in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.3 (See generally Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Memo."), R. 127-60.) To
support its motion, Defendant submitted copies of the studies that had been done
addressing the need for the Facility, Mr. Jara's Design Report and Calculations, and a
report from EMCON, the outside engineering consulting firm that had been engaged to
review the plans. (R. 162-92, 200-788.) Defendant also included correspondence and
meeting minutes showing discussions of the Facility by various government and private

3

Defendant also contended that the City had no duty to remove the ice that had
accumulated on the sidewalk along the unguarded edge of the pit, and that Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City would have been limited to a maximum of $150,000 under
the Act's damages cap. The trial court did not rule on these issues.
9

agencies. (R. 789-831.) Additionally, Defendant submitted affidavits and deposition
testimony from Mr. Jara, Mr. Stanford, and Mr. Richard Haughey, the EMCON
representative. (R. 194-98, 595-604, 790-92.)
Opposing the motion, Mr. Sandberg pointed out that in the hundreds of pages of
studies, plans, reports, and correspondence, there was no discussion whatsoever of
whether the Facility would have a chain or other safety features along the edge of the
pit, or how wide the sidewalks would be, or the pros or cons of such safety features.
(Oppo. Mem., R. 895-905.) Mr. Sandberg also explained that the existence or nonexistence of safety features for users of the Facility was not discussed at any of the
meetings in which the plans were reviewed, other than the conversation "sitting around
having a donut after the meeting, something like that." (See Stanford Depo., R. 953.)
Mr. Sandberg also noted that EMCON was not hired to review the proposed Facility's
"safety features," but only the "traffic patterns and necessary safety features for vehicles entering, unloading, and then leaving the transfer station area."

(City-EMCON

Contract % B, R. 772 (emphasis added).) Mr. Sandberg further pointed out that in fact,
EMCON did not conduct a "detailed design review" of the Facility. (Id.)
Mr. Sandberg further argued that the discretionary function exception did not bar
his claim against the City because (1) the decisions at issue, i.e., building and operating
a facility with no safety barriers along the open pit and dangerously narrow sidewalks,
were not essential to the realization of a basic governmental policy, and (2) the
decisions were not the result of a basic policy evaluation at the immunized policymaking governmental level. (Oppo. Mem., R. 905-14.) Mr. Sandberg relied exten-
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sively on Truiillo v. UDOT. 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752, in which the Utah
Court of Appeals held that the discretionary function exception did not immunize
UDOT's decision to use barrels instead of concrete barriers to separate oncoming
traffic during a highway project.
Mr. Sandberg also asserted that even if the discretionary function exception
applied to his claim, then the Act would violate the Utah Constitution, in particular the
Open Courts provision. (Oppo. Mem., R. 914-17.) Mr. Sandberg explained that the
City was engaged in a proprietary function in operating the Landfill, as (1) such services are commonly provided by private entities, and (2) just like a private entity, the
City and County charged fees for using the Landfill, which were used to fully pay for
the operation of the Landfill.
In reply, Defendant argued that because the omission of safety barriers and the
narrow sidewalks were part of the design of the Facility, they qualify as policy decisions entitled to protection under the Act. (See generally Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply Memo."), R. 1011-29.)
Defendant further asserted that Mr. Jara had consciously weighed the pros and cons of
the safety features at issue, and that his decisions were entitled to protection because the
City had delegated to him the responsibility for making those decisions. Defendant did
not really respond to Mr. Sandbergfs constitutional argument, arguing instead that because the Act defines "governmental function" very broadly, operating the Landfill
constitutes a governmental function under the Act even if it could be performed by pri-

11

vate entities, so the discretionary function exception applies. (See Reply Memo., R.
1022-25.)
The trial court held that the discretionary function exception barred Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City, and as such he could not prove that he suffered any
damages due to Defendant's failure to pursue that claim. (See Hearing Tr., R. 1083, at
66-67, Addendum Exhibit 2.) The trial court essentially reasoned that the City had delegated to Mr. Jara the responsibility of designing the Facility, and Mr. Jara's decisions
were therefore entitled to immunity. (IcL at 51-53.) The court also refused to hold the
application of the Act unconstitutional in the present case, even though the court agreed
that operation of the Landfill was a proprietary function, not a core governmental
function, under the traditional test. (Id at 66-67.)
This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Sandberg's legal malpractice claim against Defendant should be reversed. The court erred
in holding that Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City would have been barred by the
Act's discretionary function exception.

Utah law establishes that the discretionary

function exception does not apply to every governmental decision involving the exercise
of discretion; instead, the exception is limited to "broad policy decisions" requiring
evaluation of "basic governmental policy." The decisions at issue in the present case how wide the sidewalk should be and whether a safety chain should be put up along the
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edge of an open pit — simply do not fundamental policies and are not entitled to the
protection of the discretionary function exception.
Utah case law holds that a governmental decision does not qualify for the discretionary function exception unless (a) the decision is essential to the realization of a
basic governmental policy or objective, as opposed to a decision that would not change
the course of that policy, and (b) the decision is the product of basic policy evaluation
conducted at the "immunized policymaking level." Neither element is met here. First,
as alluded to above, decisions as to how wide to make a sidewalk and whether to put up
a chain are simply not essential to the realization of any basic governmental policy or
objective. Instead, they are purely matters of customer convenience, which do not
affect the course of the governmental policy at issue in the present case, namely, to
facilitate the disposal of household waste. Indeed, that the sidewalk was widened and
safety chains installed after Mr. Sandberg's injury demonstrates that these matters have
little or no bearing on the Facility's primary purpose.
Attempting to avoid this fatal defect in its case, Defendant argues that because
the narrow sidewalk and omission of the safety chain were part of the Facility's original
design, those issues necessarily constitute fundamental policy matters. This is nonsense. The City's negligence goes beyond merely designing a building with inadequate
safety features. Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City is for maintaining a dangerous
building on the day he was injured, which includes not only building the Facility but
also failing to correct the defects in the five years before Mr. Sandberg was hurt, even
though a dozen people were injured there. Moreover, Utah authority rejects Defen13

dant's argument and holds that in determining whether the discretionary function
exception applies, the proper focus is on the actual decision that led to the injury, not
on the overall plan or "design" encompassing that decision. Thus, that the dangerous
conditions were part of the Facility's original design does not mean that basic policy
matters are involved.
Discretionary function immunity is also improper because Defendant did not
establish that a conscious weighing of the pros and cons of omitting the pertinent safety
features took place at the immunized policymaking level. Defendant submitted hundreds of pages of studies, plans, and correspondence regarding the construction of the
Facility, but there is no discussion whatsoever about what safety features the Facility
would or would not have or why those features should or should not be included. Defendant argues that the decisions were made by an engineer in the City's Public Works
Department, who was "delegated" the responsibility for designing the Facility, but this
actually defeats discretionary function immunity. Utah law is clear that if a decision is
considered only by a lower level, non-policymaking employee, then the decision is not
entitled to protection under the Act.

Moreover, even if the City were entitled to

immunity for the decisions the engineer made in designing the Facility, that still would
not immunize the City from its failure to correct the safety defects once users started
falling into the pit, and there is no evidence that anyone from the City consciously
reviewed whether to improve the Facility's safety features after the Facility was built.
Thus, discretionary function immunity simply does not apply.
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Further, even if the Governmental Immunity Act were to be interpreted to bar
Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City, such an interpretation would violate the Open
Courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Operation of the Landfill is a proprietary
function, not a governmental function, and as such Mr. Sandberg would have had a
right to compensation for his injuries under the common law. Thus, the Governmental
Immunity Act, if interpreted to bar his claim, would deprive Mr. Sandberg of a common law right of recovery. And because the Act gives Mr. Sandberg no alternative
remedy and the deprivation of his rights is not necessary to fight a clear social or
economic evil, such a deprivation would violate the Open Courts provision.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. SANDBERG'S
MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT.
Mr. Sandberg initiated this malpractice action against Defendant for Defendant's
negligent failure to pursue a claim against Salt Lake City for his injuries. The trial
court dismissed Mr. Sandberg's claim on the ground that Mr. Sandberg purportedly
would be unable to show that Defendant's failure to bring a claim against the City
proximately caused him any injury, as any claim against the City would have been
barred by the "discretionary function" exception of the Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1).4 The judgment should be reversed.

4

Technically, the discretionary function doctrine operates as an exception to the
Governmental Immunity Act's broad waivers of immunity. Mr. Sandberg's claim
against the City should have been brought under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9, in which
"immunity from suit for all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from
a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or
15

A.

The trial court erred in holding that Mr. Sandbergfs claims against the City
would have been barred by the discretionary function exception.
The Governmental Immunity Act provides a limited immunity to governmental

entities for injuries arising out of the exercise of discretionary functions:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of,
in connection with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (emphasis added). Discretionary function immunity "was
not designed to cloak the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity in modern garb."
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996). Instead, it is a "distinct,
more limited form of immunity that should be applied only when a plaintiff is challenging a governmental decision that involves a basic policy-making function." IcL (emphasis added). Accordingly, "[n]ot every governmental action involving discretion is a
discretionary function within the meaning of the Act."
Trans.. 1999 UT App 227, 121, 986 P.2d 752.

Truullo v. Utah Dep't of

Instead, discretionary function

immunity is "limited to broad policy decisions 'requiring evaluation of basic governmental policy matters, not operational and ministerial acts." Healthcare Services, Inc.
v. Utah Dep't of Health. 2002 UT 5, 1 28, 40 P.3d 591 (emphasis added) (quoting
Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990)).
other public improvement," unless one of the exceptions set forth in § 63-30-10
applied. As set forth in the text, the discretionary function exception is included within

16

For the discretionary function exception to apply, the governmental entity must
establish that the act in question satisfies each of the following criteria:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a
basic governmental policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization
or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one
which would not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or
objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental
agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision?
Price v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 2000 UT App 333, 1 38, 14 P.3d 702 (emphasis addodi iqiioliiig Xrujillo If 2 7).
Additionally, because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, defendants face an even steeper burden. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sumTIKI

establishes " | l | thai llieic1 is no

.,...•

genuine issue as to any material fact and [2] that the moving paity is entitled to jiicig
ment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). For summary judgment to be propot 11 if "ivn in^ part \ umsl SUIMIIII ,«"il(k iciil ''VKICMU "M niherwise establish its I ight to
judgment. The moving party has an "affirmative burden," Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993), and if the movant fails to demonstrate
that i 10 gem ill le issue of n latei ial fact exists. tl le it :i lotioi l mi ist 'be denied. E.g., Badger
§ 63-30-10.
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v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (because moving party's affidavit failed to negate existence of disputed issue of fact, nonmoving party had no burden to present evidence in response on that issue).
Defendant failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the discretionary function
exception.

In particular, Defendant failed to establish that the omission of safety

features along the edge of the pit was essential to the realization of a basic governmental policy, program, or objective. Ct Healthcare Services. 2002 UT 5, t 28, 40
P.3d 591. Further, Defendant failed to present evidence establishing that a policymaking governmental body consciously weighed the risks and benefits of omitting the
safety features at issue. At the very least, significant issues of fact exist, rendering
summary judgment inappropriate.
1.

Defendant failed to establish that the decisions to have a six-foot
sidewalk and to omit a safety chain were "essential to the realization" of a basic governmental objective.
a.

Decisions such as whether to have safety chains or
how wide a sidewalk should be would not change the
course of the governmental policies furthered by the
operation of the Landfill and the Facility.

To establish that Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City would have been barred
under the discretionary function exception, Defendant was required to show that as a
matter of law omitting a safety chain and keeping a narrow sidewalk were both essential to accomplishing a basic governmental objective:
Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that [basic governmental] policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of
the policy, program, or objective!
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Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (quotation omitted).

Defendant's claim fails because it is

patei itl> ofr ioi is that omitting the safety features at issue was not essential to accomplishing any basic governmental goal. Instead, the decisions regarding wl lethei to have
a chain, or how wide the sidewalk should be are both decisions "which would not
change: the coi irse oi directum- i the policy, program, or objective."
In its opening memorandum below, Defendai it posited tl lat tl ite govei i n i lental
policy at issue was "the disposition of public waste in a safe, environmentally sensitive
manne r that is convenient for citizens."

(Defendant's Memo.. ^

presented no evidence, however

*•<•

t

*A'"

Defendant
iev-

ing this goal, nor did Defendant present evidence that a narrow sidewalk was similarly
esse

.... -.^ a party seeking summary judgment must show that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, Defendant's failure lo <ii ninnsti ,ite flu1 mpmianu' ul fliese
conditions requires that the judgment be reversed.
In fact. I he evidence establishes that the omission of adequate safety features was
not essential to achieving the polic\ oi mosuiim 1 lm llir s.itc nul cnmrnirni disposition
of public waste, because the defects were corrected years ago and there is no evidence
that ihi " c hanges have prevented

the fulfillment of the policy since then. Tn ' W 6 . after

Mr. Sandberg's accident (and after three otl lei peop le fell ii ito the • j m i, i i ,iia m was
installed and the sidewalk was widened to nine feet. (Stanford Depo., R. 948.) Deiendant cited absolutely no evidence that these safety enhancements prevented the achievement of the Facility's purpose. In fact, rvci since* M>% lint1 Fanlih lias been com-
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mitted to keeping the safety chain in place, despite customer complaints. (See id. at R.
949 ("Q: Is there any consideration now to removing the chain? . . . [1] A: "No.
No. There is no consideration at that at all.").) If not having a safety chain were
essential to the Facility's purposes, it is highly doubtful that the Facility would have
kept the safety chain in place since 1996.
b.

The decisions are not essential to realizing a basic
governmental policy simply because they were part of
the original designs for the Facility.

Notably, Defendant did not even attempt to argue below that building and keeping a narrow sidewalk and omitting a safety chain were essential to realizing a governmental objective. Instead, Defendant claimed that because these issues were "two of
thousands of specific features of the overall design," they were automatically immunized by the discretionary function exception: "As part of the design, it is part of the
policy making function." (Reply Memo., R. 1014-15.) Defendant further argued that
"it is hard to imagine how the objective could have been accomplished at all without the
design." (Defendant's Memo., R. 146.)
Defendant's "it's part of the design" argument misses the point for several reasons. First, Mr. Sandberg's claim is not based simply on the "design" of the Facility.
Mr. Sandberg was injured because there was no safety chain when he used the Facility
on March 25, 1996, and because the sidewalk was only six feet wide that day. Thus,
Mr. Sandberg's injury resulted not only from the original construction of the Facility,
but also from the City's failure to add a chain or sufficiently widen the sidewalk after
the Facility was built.
20

Second, Defendant proffered no authority below for the proposition ma.
ign

building or project inherently involves basic policy decisions

T-* tlv. v ontrary,

the Utah Supreme Courl appears lo lt,;i\c re wctcd DekMuliwl's argument.
v. State, 541 P. 2d
East Ski--- o
property flooded.

\ I ?ah 1^5).

. ,£

u des-

5ee Andrus

In Andrus, the design for the construction of the

..,.,.. to provide for storm water drainage, and the plaintiffs'

The St,.:, • -••

ihsuHion.m

( inclioii exception. W

the

supreme court rejected that argument, reasoning that "[t]he decision to build t
way and specifying its general location were discretionary functions, but the preparing
of plans and specifications and (he Mipei'viMon o) ilu mmm i in wiaiii die \u>rk was
carried out cannot be labeled discretionary functions." I<L at 1120 (emphasis added).
Third, even if an overall "design" were considered a matter of basic governmental policy, that i easoi ring "\Aro\ ilci it lot c: 'Xtei id tc • e\ ei y sii lgle aspect of that design.

In-

stead, Utah authority establishes that in addressing a claim of discretionary ftiiictioli
immunity, a court must focus on the particular decision that led to the plaintiff's injury.
For exampL

nu1 one ai kii, this rouri held

lrujillo, a i a\e lenorkabh sinnlai i

that discretionary function immunity did not relieve UDOT of liability for mjuiies

nf-

fered as a result of an unsafe traffic control plan implemented as part of the I ^ struction project in Weber

CWAW-/

'.rajiUo. ! l >° (|

!,

\\*y l!1

l

"^

i -'-,», o 2 . 5

While one side of the freeway was being rebuilt, traffic was routed onto the opposite
side, requiring a 'two-lane two-way operation."
plastic barrels instead of con

IcL

€

A

TT

DOT determined that
;J

21

^ opposing lanes

of traffic, and the plaintiffs were injured when an oncoming driver crossed through the
barrels into their lane.
The plaintiffs asserted that UDOT should have used concrete barriers to separate
the lanes, but the trial court granted summary judgment for UDOT under the discretionary function exception. This Court reversed. The Court recognized that the plan to
use barrels for traffic separation was part of the overall plan for the entire 1-84 project.
IdL 15. Nevertheless, in addressing the discretionary function exception, the Court
focused on the particular decision that led to the injuries, i.e., the decision to use
barrels instead of barriers. IdL fl 31-33. In fact, the Court held that while the decision
to rebuild the freeway was an immune discretionary function, the choice to use the
barrels for traffic separation was not a discretionary ftmction. The Court farther
stressed that in considering the applicability of the discretionary function doctrine,
"[a]negations that a governmental entity has been negligent must be separately examined to determine if each act complained of is an immunized discretionary ftmction or is
merely an operational or ministerial implementation of an already-established policy."
IcL % 23 (emphasis added).
Earlier authority, too, defeats Defendant's argument that decisions concerning
safety features constitute basic policy decisions simply because those decisions may be
made in the course of executing a larger overall plan or design. For example, in
Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888, 891-92 (1972), the
Utah Supreme Court held that a road supervisor was not making a basic policy decision
5

A copy of Trujillo is attached as Addendum Exhibit 5.
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when he decided to use berms as the sole means of warning drivers nm

n.ni was

washed out; instead, the supervisor was engaged in "the operational level of decision
making " Sirnilai 1 \. in Andrus, .-.

•

.- s .ae s design ot :i highway

project and storm system as part of a reconstruction project wore not disuriionarv
functions.
v- :

:~ both instances, as in Trujillo, the decisions at issue were encompassed

•-•:.-

actually led to the injur}.

net's, I lit" courts IOCUSLX

-^ decisions that

. . mo, tiiwic is no basis for Defendant - •;- - ni iini ihe

focus of the discretionary function exception must be on the overall "design" of the
Facility instead ol r r Hie lailuiv lo include adequate safety features both in the initial
construction and after the Facility opened.
Finally, Defendant's argument that every single detail within the overall "de
sign" ''it I lie F-iCjhty constitute , a hioad policy matter is completely illogical, as shown
by the following hypothetical. Suppose that engineering SIJIMLIHI1- I<M J ("if\ -nvned
parking garage required the floors to be supported by posts at least two feet in diamekM , hut I he < ""ly'"s engineers mistakenly designed one-foot support posts, and the
floors collapsed. The width of support posts w(
sands of features" of the overall design of the garage. Yet it would be ludicrous to
argue tlui (In uin luni MI|>|><MI pish w\ IC "essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program, or objective," CL Keegaiu 8% V M at
624, simply because the posts were included in those plans. It is likewise ludicrous for
Defendants to uit'tic thai (fie width o| a sidewalk, or the existence or nonexistence of a
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chain, is likewise essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental
policy.
Accordingly, Defendants are wrong in claiming that "the design of the Facility"
was essential to achieving the asserted policy of safe waste disposal, or that the policy
could not have been achieved "without the design." A different design, e.g., one with
chains and wider sidewalks, could have achieved the governmental policy (and have
prevented Mr. Sandberg's injury). At any rate, the evidence certainly does not establish as a matter of law that decisions regarding the chain and the sidewalk width were
essential to fulfill the purposes of the Facility.
c.

The policies behind the discretionary function
immunity would not be furthered by holding that the
decisions at issue in the present case constitute basic
governmental policy decisions.

The discretionary function exception, like governmental immunity in general,
denies compensation to persons who have been injured as a result of another's negligence. The discretionary function exception is ordinarily justified, however, by the
countervailing public policy notion that a government must be allowed to govern and
that governing necessarily involves making policy decisions that should not be secondguessed by courts or individual litigants. As the court explained in Keegan, discretionary function immunity is designed "to shield those governmental acts and decisions
impacting on large numbers of persons in a myriad of unforeseen ways from individual
and class legal actions, the continual threat of which would make public administration
all but impossible."

Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (quotation and internal punctuation
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omitted). The so-called "policies" furthered by the City's omission of saleh leaturTS
around the edge of the pit, however, do not involve "governmental" policies at all; they
an; puni.irily inuttns oi customer convenience. Thus, there is nothing "governmental"
about the decisions made regarding the safety features.

In fail

ihese decisions arc

made by private businesses every day, and courts are perfectly competent to determine
if soi.ii divisions vu'tr uiifcasoiubk: ami lo award compensation where appropriate.
In other words, the decisions at issue in the nreseni ruse am ml i i oiiipieiciv
different nature than decisions like the one in Keegan, which involved whether to engage

• -ient involving delays a

inconvenience to every

motorist who traveled down Parleys Canyon. CX Keegan.. - ^ V
the-mill matters like whether to put up a chain or whethei ., sidewalk should be nine
feet \\u\r ratlin iiiam u

luxi simplv \uii noi "impact[] large numbers of persons in a

myriad of unforeseen ways." The bottom lint is dial I In* IIIM retioiwn, function i/vivp
tion is not intended to protect mundane decisions like the ones at issue in the present
case,

Sandberg's claim would be a gross injustice. Defen-

dant therefore cannot show that Mr. Sandber

: <•

••

, bv

governmental immunity.
2.

Defendant failed to establish that the decisions at issue required the
actual exercise of basic policy evaluation at the immunized policymaking level.

Additionally, Defendant failed to present evidence below establishing that the
dec is;

sidewalk and omit safety chains resulted from "the exercise

of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise
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n Hie part ol ilie goveminenlul

agency involved." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. To meet this element, Defendant must
show that the decisions regarding the sidewalk and safety chains were "the result of serious and extensive policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise," and that a "conscious
balancing of risks and advantages took place" at the "immunized policy-making level."
Tnijillo. 1999 UT App 227, 11 27, 33, 986 P.2d 752; Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983).
a.

No one acting at a policy-making level considered
whether to omit the safety features at issue in this
case.

In Trujillo, this Court held that discretionary function immunity was not available to UDOT because UDOT failed to present evidence that the issue of whether to
use barrels or concrete barriers for traffic separation was discussed at the immunized
policy-making level. The Court noted that plans for the entire reconstruction project
underwent extensive review:
Plans for the entire 1-84 project were drafted, formulated, and approved
in a series of meetings and reviews over the course of approximately one
year. Participants included Federal Highway Administration representatives; UDOT maintenance, engineering, design, and administrative personnel; and several city and county officials.
Trujillo, 1999 UT App 227, 1 5, 986 P.2d 752. The court also noted, however, that
"the record contains no evidence that the traffic control plan was ever specifically
singled out for discussion, review, or approval at any point in the approval process."
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court thus held that the discretionary function exception did not immunize
UDOT's decision to separate traffic with barrels, even though both the project design
26

engineer and UDOT's Region One Design Engineer had engaged it i discussions
weighing the traffic separation options. The Court's reasoning is instructive:
In this appeal, on the other hand, it is undisputed that the traffic
control plan was formulated by an unlicensed UDOT staff engineer - an
employee who did not perform at the policy-making level. Further, while
the record on appeal contains a general description of the multi-level
approval process for plans and specifications pertaining to the 1-84
resurfacing project, UDOTfs evidence does no more than establish that
the traffic control plan could have been discussed in those meetings.
UDOT does not point us to evidence that the traffic control plan and
the barrels-versus-barriers decision was in fact the subject of intense
scrutiny and review. IJDOT now characterizes the decision to use
barrels as a "tough choice" between two traffic separation methods and
now draws our attention to the relative risks and benefits of barrels and
barriers. However, UDOT's evidence shows these issues were addressed only in private discussions between the project design engineer
who drafted the traffic control plan and UDOTfs Region One Design
Engineer. These facts are insufficient to bring the formulation of the
traffic control plan within the scope of discretionary function immunity.
Id. 1| 31 "i italics in *ii igttiitl,, I nkl initial i
In holding discretionary immunity inapplicable, the Trujillo court distil iguished
Keegan, in which the Utah Supreme Court held that discretionary immunity protected
UDOT'^ decision n<ii "« "cpLiu: ntetluii harriers on 1 80' in Parley's Canyon that vio
lated relevant safety standards. Keegan, 896 P.2d 618. Ilie barrier s in Keegan originally complied with the standards, but two overlay projects raised the road level,
effectively redw. iiij; \\w \wv*\\\ •! 11 • i I >:n i ici iiiul NIL1 plaintiff s husband was killed
when his car climbed the barrier and slid into a bridge support. The Trujjjju mini
pointed out that in Keegan, UDOT had gone through a detailed process in deciding not
to raise tl le ban iei , ii icli icili lg a creatii lg a safety study thai ' comprehensive[ly]" analyzed accident rates and a "cost-benefit report" that addressed nuuKToih " ignitiianl
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factors such as the cost, the fact that the highway was to be redone in a few years anyway, the delays and inconvenience of an additional construction project, etc. Trujillo
t 30 (citing Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624). The study and report were compiled by senior
engineers and circulated and debated throughout UDOT. IcL Trujillo noted that the
decision not to raise the barriers in Keegan "'involved just the sort of policy-driven
weighing of costs and benefits that the discretionary function exception was meant to
protect.'" IcL
The case at bar is exactly on all fours with Trujillo. As in Trujillo, "the record
contains no evidence that the [omission of safety measures] was ever specifically singled out for discussion, review, or approval at any point in the approval process."
Trujillo t 5. To the contrary, the evidence shows that the omission of safety features
was not singled out for attention. In fact, in the entire six-inch stack of reports and
plans Defendant filed to support its summary judgment motion, there is barely a mention of whether safety chains would be installed or how wide the sidewalks would be,
and there appears to be no discussion of the costs and benefits of safety chains or
sidewalk widths. Similarly, the safety features at issue were not considered at review
meetings with the Public Works Department or the Council, and no decision was made
by the Public Works Department or the Council to omit such features.
Instead, as in Trujillo, these issues were addressed, considered, and resolved by
a staff engineer, Paul Jara, and there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Jara was responsible for making governmental policy decisions. Mr. Jara was employed by Salt
Lake City's Public Works Department, which had 108 employees, of which approxim28

ately ten to fifteen percent were engineers. (JaraDepo., R. 597.; Mr. I ant iqmitoil 10
the "engineering administrator" of his department, who in turn reported to the Public
Works DifTiilo]

Mil

I :»WM)X 1 Mi ILILI icsfilinl (hat Public Works was only one

of "many" different engineering departments in Salt Lake City powrnnuMii

ild.)

Thus, as in Trujillo, the issue of whether to install a chain or how wide the sidewalk
shoi ilci 1: 1 w as discussed 01 ) lj b> ai 1 e mplo> ee "wl 10 did not perform, at the policymaking level." Trujillo If 31. 6
That the Council never discussed the matters upon which Mr. Sandberg's claim
agaj, •

I'II , \ nilil h;i\r been based is fatal 10 Defendant's discretionary function

argument, because it was the Council's role to "determine bi oad matters of polic> regarding the operation and management of any solid waste processing and disposal facilities."

i liik'i iMiiL.i! 1 "oopeiatiuii Agreement,

> ^art of this function, the

Council was specifically directed to "[r]eview an 1 establis
activities that are major and nature and require policy determinations.

v ldj

in oilier

winds, the deasiom tit issue in the present case were not considered by the very body
expressly charged with "determining] broad matters o1 polio "

6

Before the trial court, Defendant asserted that Mr. Jara was an "expert[]
retained by these governmental bodies [the City and County] to make such decisions
[concerning the sidewalks and safety chains]." (Reply Memo, at 6, R. 1016.) there is
There is no indication, however, that Mr. Jara was any more of an "expert" than the
engineer who designed the traffic control plan in Trujillo. Instead, like the engineer in
Trujillo, Mr. Jara was an engineer already on the City's staff who happened to draw
the assignment of designing the Facility. In fact, Mr. Jara had never designed a waste
unloading facility prior to designing the one at issue in the present case. (Jara Depo.,
R 6030
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b.

The City cannot satisfy the "conscious weighing"
requirement simply by "delegating" the decisions to a
staff engineer.

Recognizing that the Council did not address the Facility's lack of safety features, Defendant instead argued (and the trial court ruled) that the Council did not need
to discuss those matters, because those matters were left to Mr. Jara and Mr. Stanford
to decide. This argument, however, directly contradicts Trujillo. In Trujillo. the issue
of whether to use barriers or barrels to separate the traffic lanes was left to the staff
engineer who designed the traffic control plan and the Region One Design Engineer
with whom he discussed the matter. Trujillo, 1999 UT App 227 if 31, 986 P.2d 752.
But the court held that because the decision was not made at the "immunized policymaking level," the discretionary function exception did not apply. In other words, the
fundamental principle to be derived from Trujillo is that if a decision can be left
completely in the hands of a non-policymaking subordinate, then the decision is not
entitled to the protection of the discretionary function exception.
That reasoning applies with full force to the present case. The Council, charged
with determining policy matters, did not deem the issue of safety features to be important enough for the Council to be directly involved. As Mr. Stanford testified, "They
[the Council] don't like to get into the minute to minute details," and chains and sidewalk widths were minute-to-minute details. (Stanford Depo., R. 942.) If the Council
itself determined that the safety features were not important enough for the Council to
be directly involved, then those decisions are not important enough to qualify under the
discretionary function exception.
30

If is also significant that there was no policy level review oi

-

o

install safety chains and widen the sidewalks after Mr. Sandberg was injured. The
Landfill Counul h.i I iintluii;/ l \U\ wii'li \\h)\v mailers; instead, "[w]e just did that on
our own." (Stanford Depo., R. 937, 941, 951-52.) Once again, ii thr umssion uf
safety chains and the narrow sidewalk resulted from extensive consideration by policymakuip govcinninKal niiiiit"\ m M
I iiouhiim ifui iimse decisions could have been so
easily overridden. Cj\ Trujillo 1 34 n.4.
Just as in Trujillo, the decisions to omit safety chains and build a narrow sidewalk were mad*' .i! Ilii ln\\ l< u I riinnaTiiig kwl and everyone else went along without independently addressing the issue. The omission of safety feature muv h;ive been
included in the plans that were approved by policy-making bodies, but there is nothing
to suggest lfi;i< Hi use issues viae sing led out ; i nd specifically considered by the responsible parties. Accordingly, discretionary function immumiv » unplv dues nut .ipplv.
c

Even if Mr. Jara were acting in a policymaking
position, summary judgment was still inappropriate
because he did not consciously consider all of the acts
and omissions that led to Mr. Sandberg1 s injury.

Moreover, even if the City were entitled to discretionary function immunity for
decisions actually made by Mr. Jara, Mr. Sandberg still would have a claim against the
City, because there is no evidence III I M1

'.if > 'luih ,m\

onsurv, decisions con-

cerning safety at the Facility after it was built. Once again, Mr. Sandberg was not injured because the Facility was unreasonably dangerous when it opened; he was injured
because the Facility was uniVrisonahK ilaiigeimis i»n \ltin it \ lwt\
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i he unreason-

ably dangerous condition that led to Mr. Sandberg's injury resulted not only from the
inadequate safety features in the original design, but also from the failure to add such
safety features during the five years after the Facility opened, even though the potential
for injury was obvious (see Photographs, R. 931, Add. Ex. 4) and even though a dozen
people had been injured falling into the pit. CH Trujillo 1 34 (independently addressing
"the negligent acts UDOT allegedly committed after the traffic control plan was in effect in the construction zone" and holding that those allegations of negligence "involve
operational decisions on the part of UDOT").
The record contains no evidence that Mr. Jara was involved at all in any decisions regarding the Facility after it was built. (See Jara Aff. ^ 1-7, R. 1034-36; Jara
Depo., R. 595-604.) Thus, because there is no evidence that the failure to improve the
safety features after the initial construction was the result of a "conscious weighing of
pros and cons," even by Mr. Jara, Mr. Sandberg still would have had a claim against
the City. Or more appropriately, because this is an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment, Defendant has not established that Mr. Sandberg would not have had a claim
against the City. Thus, it was error for the trial court to dismiss Mr. Sandberg's entire
claim against Defendant.
B.

Applying the Governmental Immunity Act to bar Mr, Sandbergfs claims
against the City would have violated the Utah Constitution, as the City was
engaged in a proprietary function in owning and operating the Landfill.
Because the trial court erred in ruling that the discretionary function exception

would have barred Mr. Sandberg's claim against Salt Lake City, Defendant's motion
for summary judgment was improperly granted, and reversal is required. Reversal is
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also required, however, because to the extent that the Governmental Immunity Act bars
Mr. Sandberg's claim the Act violates article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the Open Courts provision, states
in pertinent part that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). Under this provision, "an individual [may]
not be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual
rights." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). Accordingly,
where the legislature passes a statute that deprives a person of a remedy that existed at
common law, the deprivation violates the Open Courts Provision unless (a) the legislative scheme provides an "effective and reasonable alternative remedy" for his injuries, or (b) abrogation of Mr. Sandberg's remedy is justified by a "clear social or economic evil." Id at 680. In the present case, Mr. Sandberg has a common law right to
recover compensation for his injuries because they resulted from the City's engagement
in a proprietary function, not an essential governmental function. Further, Mr. Sandberg has no alternative remedy for his injuries, and abrogation of his remedy is not
justified by a clear social or economic evil.
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1.

Denying Mr. Sandberg compensation for the injuries he sustained
as a result of the City's negligent operation of the Facility would
deprive Mr. Sandberg of rights existing at common law.
a.

Governmental immunity implicates a plaintiff's rights
under the Open Courts provision unless the injury
arises out of an essential governmental function.

The Utah Supreme Court has established that governmental immunity implicates
rights protected by the Open Courts provision unless the immunized activity was a true
governmental function: an activity "of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency" or an activity that is "essential to the core of governmental activity." See DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995). If the
activity at issue could just as easily be performed by a private entity, then the activity is
considered "proprietary," for which a remedy existed under the common law, and abrogating the remedy by the Governmental Immunity Act would violate the Open Courts
provision unless the abrogation were justified.
The "essential to the core of a governmental activity" test adopted in DeBrv was
originally formulated in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37
(Utah 1980), which addressed the interpretation of the Governmental Immunity Act as
it existed at the time. At that time, the Act provided governmental immunity only for
the exercise of a "governmental function" but did not define what constituted such a
function.

In 1987, the legislature amended the Act to state that anything a govern-

mental entity did was considered a "governmental function" for purposes of the Act.
In DeBrv, however, the Utah Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was limited by the Open Courts provision. The court recognized that while
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Standiford was not interpreting the state constitution, the test derived in that case "drew
a line between article I, section 11 interests and governmental immunity in a manner
consistent with the underlying concept of governmental immunity as it existed at statehood. " DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440. Accordingly, the court held that the Standiford test is
the starting point for determining whether a particular application of sovereign immunity complies with article I, section 11. The court cautioned, however, that legislative
determinations must be afforded a presumption of constitutionality. IcL The court further explained that "in applying the Standiford test, the Court must, among other
things, evaluate whether the effect of tort liability would promote public safety or defeat essential or core governmental activities and programs that are critical to the protection of public safety and welfare." Id, (footnotes omitted).
b.

The City's construction and operation of the Facility
was not an essential governmental function.

Under the Standiford test, which is now the starting point for the constitutional
analysis, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the maintenance and operation of a
municipal sewer system was not a governmental function because such functions could
also be provided by private parties. Thomas v. Clearfield City. 642 P.2d 737, 739
(Utah 1982). The court reasoned that "[e]ven assuming that the collection and disposal
of sewage is most effectively, safely, and inexpensively performed by a governmental
body, we do not agree that these functions are uniquely governmental or essential to the
core of its activity." IcL (emphasis added). The court expressly rejected the city's
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argument that operation of a sewer was a core governmental function even though statutes authorized cities to provide sewer systems and enforce mandatory hookups.
As with the collection and disposal of municipal sewage, the collection and disposal of municipal garbage cannot be considered a uniquely governmental function nor
a function essential to the core of governmental activity. Just as in Thomas, the Utah
Code authorizes, but does not require, municipalities to provide solid waste management services:
Subject to the powers and rules of the department, the governing
body of each public entity may:
(1)
supervise and regulate the collection, transportation, and
disposition of all solid waste generated within its jurisdiction; [and]
(2)
provide solid waste management facilities to handle adequately solid waste generated or existing without or without its jurisdiction . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-503 (emphasis added).
Significantly, solid waste disposal services can and often are provided by private
entities. According to Mr. Stanford, between 10 and 20 percent of municipal solid
waste landfills are privately operated, and the trend has been that the number of private
landfills is increasing while the number of publicly owned landfills is decreasing sharply. (See Stanford Depo., R. 943-44, 962-63.) The Environmental Protection Agency
likewise reports that as of approximately 1992, private landfills accounted for more
than half of the landfill market segment. (Environmental Protection Agency, Report to
Congress: Flow Controls and Municipal Solid Waste, EPA Doc. 530-R-95-008, R.
982, 988.)
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Utah law expressly authorizes the disposal of solid waste by private parties. The
Utah Code states that any "person" may "own, construct, modify, or operate any facility or site for the purpose of disposing of nonhazardous solid waste" if approval for
the facility is received. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(3)(a). And in 1975, the Utah
Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance that prohibited private parties from collecting or disposing of trash on a commercial basis. Parker v. Provo City Corp., 543
P.2d 769 (Utah 1975). Indeed, in 1988 the Landfill Council even considered privatizing its operation. (Landfill Evaluation and Privatization Study, R. 211-305.)
In other words, as designer, owner, and operator of the Landfill, Salt Lake City
acts in a proprietary capacity, just like a private entity. Just like a private entity, the
Landfill is not supported by tax revenues; instead, the Landfill charges fees to fund its
operation and is designed to be (and is) financially self-sufficient. (See Stanford Depo.,
R. 945-47 ("All of the money to operate everything here comes from fees that we
collect from users.").) Thus, under the Standiford test, as modified and applied in
DeBry, operating the Facility is not a governmental function, and interpreting the Governmental Immunity Act to allow the City to escape liability for its negligence in designing and operating the Facility would have deprived Mr. Sandberg of a right that
existed at common law.7

7

The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that UTA's operation of a public
transportation mstituted a governmental function under the traditional test, and as such
application of the Act's damages cap did not violate the Open Courts provision. Parks
v. UTA, 2002 UT 55, 449 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (June 14, 2002). The court stressed that
the vast majority of UTA's revenues came from public financing, and that UTA "is not
self-supporting and would not survive on income from its revenue-producing activ37

Additionally, imposing tort liability on the City for its operation of the Landfill
would certainly "promote public safety" and would not "defeat essential or core governmental activities or programs that are critical to the protection of the public safety
and welfare." DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440. Holding the City liable for its negligence in
designing, building, and operating the Facility would promote public safety for the
same reasons that holding any defendant liable for its negligence promotes public
safety: Making the City responsible for the costs of injuries caused by its own negligence will give the City an incentive to prevent accidents in the first place. And there
is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that holding the City liable for its operation of the
Landfill would defeat any essential or core governmental programs.
2.

The deprivation of Mr. Sandberg's remedy for his injuries violates
the Open Courts provision because no alternative remedy has been
provided and such deprivation is not justified by a clear social evil.

Accordingly, under the holding in DeBry, Mr. Sandberg's right to recover compensation for the injuries he sustained as a result of the City's negligence in operating
the Landfill is protected by article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. Thus, for the
deprivation of that right to be proper, the defendant must show that (a) the legislative
scheme provides an "effective and reasonable alternative remedy" for his injuries, or

ities." Id, 11 10-13. The Court further noted that UTA was statutorily prohibited
from competing with private businesses. IdL 1 13. In contrast, the Landfill is selfsupporting, and there is nothing that prohibits the Landfill from competing with private
companies for the solid waste disposal business. Thus, Parks does not affect Mr.
Sandberg's argument that applying the Governmental Immunity Act to bar his claim
would be unconstitutional.
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(b) abrogation of Mr. Sandberg's remedy is justified by a "clear social or economic
evil." Berry, 717 P.2d at 680 (Utah 1985).
The Governmental Immunity Act does not provide Mr. Sandberg with any alternative remedy for his injuries. Instead, like the statute of repose found unconstitutional
in Berry, 717 P.2d 670, the Act (if the discretionary function were to apply) simply
bars Mr. Sandberg's claim. The Act is unlike workers' compensation or no-fault insurance statutes, in which a right to a tort remedy is restricted in exchange for a right to
recovery that is broader is scope but more limited in amount. Cf. Warren v. Melville,
937 P.2d 556, 558-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding no-fault statute constitutional);
Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d
612 (1948) (holding workers' compensation statute constitutional).

Instead, Mr.

Sandberg is simply left out in the cold, with absolutely no compensation for medical
expenses, lost income, lost earning capacity, or pain and suffering.
Similarly, the record contains no evidence that abrogating Mr. Sandberg's right
to compensation for his injuries is justified by any social or economic evil. Once again,
because the City was in the same position as a private entity in building and operating
the Facility, and because Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City is no different from an
ordinary tort claim against a private business entity, it is difficult to imagine what evil
could justify the complete abrogation of Mr. Sandberg's right to recover for the
excruciating injuries he suffered at the Facility.
It is important to remember that this matter comes before the Court on an appeal
from a grant of summary judgment. Thus, reversal is appropriate unless Defendant
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presented sufficient evidence to establish its right to judgment as a matter of law, and in
making this determination, all factual issues must be resolved in Mr. Sandberg's favor.
Mr. Sandberg respectfully submits that the current record certainly does not establish as
a matter of law that Mr. Sandbergfs claim against the City would have been barred,
because at the very least, there are disputed issues of fact as to whether application of
the Governmental Immunity Act to bar Mr. Sandberg's claim would have violated the
Open Courts provision. Accordingly, even if the Court were to determine that the
City's decisions in building and operating the Facility were covered by the discretionary function exception, summary judgment still would not be appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff/appellant Albert Sandberg therefore respectfully requests that the Court
vacate the Third District Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims and
asks that the Court remand the matter to the Third District Court for further proceedings.
DATED:

July jff_, 2002.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

yy&ftu P ^fl^
Franci^J. Carney
Stephen P. Horvat
Attorneys for Albert Sandberg
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 10th day of July, 2002, two true and correct copies of BRIEF OF
APPELLANT were served by first-class United States mail addressed to:
Matthew L. Lalli
SNELL & WILMER
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM
1.

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 1072-74.

2.

Transcript of Hearing, January 10, 2002 (portions), R. 1083.

3.

Preliminary Diagram of Facility, R. 643.

4.

Photographs of Facility, R. 931.

5.

Truiillo v. UDOT. 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752.
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1

MR. CARNEY:

2

THE COURT:

3

Yeah.
Yeah.

It says they may.
It just says if you're going to do

it -

4

MR. CARNEY:

Yeah.

And in fact there are profitable

5

private dumps in Utah.

There's a new one in Utah County.

6

There's that big one down in Price.

7

THE COURT: Right.

8

MR. CARNEY: And -

9

THE COURT:

10

They're making lots of money, I'm

told.

11
12

Right.

MR. CARNEY:

I'm not going to discuss the ice on the

sidewalk issue.

13

THE COURT:

I would think that she doesn't win on

14

that.

I mean I don't mind throwing it out, but I wanted to

15

hear them on that one. And in all candor, it seems to me she

16

maybe has prevailed on the other, but that's okay.

17

be candid.

18

there's a lot of discretion went in here, and that's what they

19

meant.

I have to

But I think on the discretion, I'm convinced that

20

MR. CARNEY: Well -

21

THE COURT: No. Not that you haven't ably stated the

22

other side, but I mean that's my job here, to decide, well,

23

were some policy makers involved.

24

ahead.

25

points, but for that one, all carry the day in my mind.

I'm happy they were.

But go

I mean I don't want to cut you off because I think your
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1

MR. CARNEY:

Yeah.

And I think -

2

THE COURT: And I guess it's a bummer because Horvat

3

would have liked to have been here to argue it because he's

4

the — but I guess it's an issue of level of policy decision

5

making and who was given that job.

6

either the council that runs the dump or the Salt Lake City

7

Council truly getting into the business of overseeing every

8

aspect of a design.

9

would be putting, in my mind, kind of a form over substance.

10

If they had to okay every idea, every city council

I mean I can't imagine

They delegate those things.

To do so

11

would just okay what their engineers have done.

12

have enough expertise and/or time and/or inclination.

13

that's why we have the principle of delegating things, and so

14

it strikes me that here Salt Lake City delegated it to this

15

Jera and this Stanford, and Stanford and Jera obviously went on

16

the — I mean they didn't pay their way to go to dumps.

17

went on the city's dime to look at those things.

18

They don't
So

They

So it seems to me that that was the policy that was

19

intended.

Look at it, weigh the pros and cons.

20

so this to me is really a discretionary decision.

They did, and

21

MR. CARNEY:

To the level of summary judgment?

22

THE COURT: Well, if you - I mean it's a

23

discretionary decision.

They don't give up immunity.

If they

24

don't give up immunity, you can't sue them.

25

them, Mr. Jensen didn't make an error in not bringing a claim

If you can't sue
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1

against them.

2

MR. CARNEY: All right.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CARNEY:

5

THE COURT:

Isn't that kind of the trail?
Sure. That's the trail.
But I mean there is not going to be any

6

believable evidence, is there, that they didn't consider it?

7

If you get those two guys on, who's going to say — who in the

8

world?

9

exist.

I mean you don't have anybody.

Such person doesn't

10

MR. CARNEY: Well, what about -

11

THE COURT:

12

I did.

I'm sorry.

Jera didn't think about it. Well, yeah,

I did.

13

MR. CARNEY: Well, Jera was going to say that he —

14

THE COURT:

Jera's going to say he did.

Stanford's

15

going to say he did, and that's going to be the only evidence

16

the jury will have, right?

17
18
19
20

MR. CARNEY: And the evidence is going to be that no
one else every considered it besides those two.
THE COURT: Right. And so then that becomes a legal
question, right?

21

MR. CARNEY: Right.

22

THE COURT: Are those of a sufficient policy-making

23

status that their decision is a governmental weighing of cost,

24

benefits, carrying on a purpose, all those considerations?

25

it has to be a legal question, no matter how you get down to

And
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1

it.

2

MR. CARNEY: Right.

3

THE COURT:

I'm not going to give that to the jury.

4

Is he on the hierarchy?

5

that's what it comes down to.

6
7

MR. CARNEY:

Where do you place him?

Yeah.

I think

No, that is going to be your

decision —

8

THE COURT: Right.

9

MR. CARNEY: - after hearing this.

10

THE COURT: And so I think, given the way this falls

11

out, that he's the engineer and given the job to do this, that

12

it is a discretionary function, for the reasons Ms. Romero has

13

raised to me.

14

don't think in this case, with these facts, that I could come

15

out any differently.

16
17

I understand your view to the contrary, but I

MR. CARNEY: And we would need a decision also on the
constitutionality.

18

THE COURT:

Do I have to do that?

Because can't I do

19

it like the appellate guys do and say, You know, I've got this

20

one — and in truth this is what happened.

21

tore back and forth.

I looked at it.

I

I mean —

22

MR. CARNEY:

23

THE COURT: — I was jumping from side to side, you

24
25

I hate to make -

know.
MR. CARNEY:

Well, in your -
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1

THE COURT:

That's a tough valley.

2

MS. ROMERO: — a lot of money.

I mean this case has

3

been going for some time now.

4

not — as I read their pleadings, I didn't read it to raise the

5

constitutionality of the —

6

THE COURT:

I think that, you know, this is

Let me go back.

I think this is what

7

I'll do. I'm going to grant the motion for the summary

8

judgment on the part of the defendant on the basis that

9

Sandberg couldn't have prevailed against Salt Lake City.

10

Jensen's lawsuit wouldn't have gone anywhere because this would

11

have been a discretionary function and they would have retained

12

their immunity.

13

overrode Standiford,

14

Because that's how I believe I'd come out, Mr. Carney.

And that the statute passed in ^87 which
changed the rules, it's constitutional.

15

MR. CARNEY: Okay.

16

THE COURT: And if it matters, if it's a benefit, if

17

Standiford

18

that today that I would have concluded that a landfill was not

19

a core governmental function and it would not have been

20

included under this umbrella.

21

were in place, it was according to me in reviewing

So I guess those first three parts.

Right.

It's

22

constitutional, the landfill is not a core government function,

23

but under the laws it is today.

24

exercise of a high-level policy discretionary function that

25

allows for the immunity to be retained.

This is a clear, in my mind,
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1

Ms. Romero, is there something more you need before

2

you draw me an order?

3

MS. ROMERO:

4
5
6

No.

I'll prepare an order and send it

to Mr. Carney.
THE COURT:

Okay. Anything more that we need to

discuss right now?

7

MR. CARNEY:

I don't think so.

8

THE COURT:

9

(WHEREUPON the hearing was concluded at 3:29 p.m.)

Okay.

Thank you both.
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Photo taken shortly after
Sandberg's fall in April
1996

Photo taken after
barriers were erected
and sidewalk widened
in late 1996
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on Macris's claims for successor liability be- We therefore reverse and remand for procause disputed issues of material fact exist as ceedings consistent with this opinion.
to whether Neways was Images's successor.
1118 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W.
The rule for a claim based on successor
BENCH, Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS,
liability is that
where one company sells or otherwise Judge
transfers all its assets to another company
the latter is not liable for the debts and
liabilities of the transferor, except where:
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume such debts; (2) the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or
merger of the seller and purchaser; (3) the
1999 UTApp 227
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the
Alan TRUJILLO and Sharon Trujillo,
transaction is entered into fraudulently in
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
order to escape liability for such debts.
v.
Florom v. Elliott, 867 F.2d 570, 575,n. 2 (10th
Cir.1989).
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc., a
[8] 1116 Although the trial court found
California corporation; and John Does I
that Neways was Images's successor, our
through X, Defendants and Appellees.
review of the record reveals that disputed
issues of material fact exist as to whether
No. 981331-CA.
Neways had the same officers and directors
'Court of Appeals of Utah.
as Images,3 whether there was consideration
for the transfer of assets from Images to
July 22, 1999.
Neways, and whether Images fraudulently
transferred its assets to Neways to avoid
paying Macris damages awarded in the first
Motorists who were injured in head-on
suit. Because material disputed facts exist, collision on stretch of interstate that was
we conclude the trial court erred in granting under construction sued Utah Department of
summary judgment ^on Macris's claim for Transportation and general contractor. The
successor liability.
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
Homer F. Wilkinson, J., granted summary
CONCLUSION
judgment to defendants. Appeal was taken to
1117 The facts giving rise to Macris's claim Supreme Court, which transferred the matagainst Neways arose after Macris filed its ter. The Court of Appeals, Orme, held that:
amended complaint in the action against Im- (1) UDOTs formulation of traffic control
ages. As a result, the doctrine of claim plan, including decision to use barrels rather
preclusion did not require Macris to litigate than concrete barriers to separate traffic
its claims against Neways in the earlier ac- coming from opposing directions, was not a
tion. Thus, the trial court erred in granting discretionary function so as to be immune
summary judgment in fayor of Neways on from potential liability; (2) UDOTs alleged
Macris's claims for fraudulent transfer and negligence in failing to reduce speed in conalter ego. Moreover, because material dis- struction zone as called for in traffic control
puted facts exist as to whether Neways was plan, failing to investigate accidents, and failImages's successor, the trial court also erred ing to meaningfully consider corrective action
in granting summary judgment in favor of in response to letter from contractor, did not
Macris on its claims for successor liability. fall within discretionary function exception;
3. Neways admitted that it is Images's privy for
purposes oFMacns's motion for summary judgment. This admission, however, was made m

opposition to Macris's motion for summary judgment, thus, Neways is not bound by this admission for purposes of the successor liability claim.

TRUJELLO v. UTAH DEPT. OF TRANSP.

Utah 753

Cite as 986 P.2d 752 (UtahApp. 1999)

(3) and questions of fact existed as to whether traffic control plan that was executed by
general contractor was unreasonably dangerous, and as to whether contractor negligently
executed that plan, precluding summary
judgment for contractor.
Reversed and remanded.
Billings, J., concurred in result.
1. Appeal and Error <&=>934(1)
On appeal from summary judgment,
Court of Appeals would state the fact in the
light most favorable to appellants.
2. Judgment «=»181(33)
Because negligence cases often require
the drawing of inferences from the facts,
which is properly done by juries rather than
judges, summary judgment is appropriate in
,negligence cases only in the clearest instances.
3. States <3=>191.4(1)
"Sovereign immunity" precludes lawsuits
against state governmental entities without
the government's consent.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

4. States «=>112.1(2)
Determination of whether Governmental
Immunity Act bars negligence claim against
state involves three-step inquiry: first,
whether governmental conduct at issue was a
governmental function to which general
grant of immunity applies; second, if the
conduct is a governmental function, whether
the Act waives immunity for injuries arising
out of the particular governmental function
at issue; and finally, even if immunity is
otherwise waived, whether an exception applies that retains immunity for the exercise
of that governmental function. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-3(1), 63-30-10.
5. Municipal Corporations <s=>728
Discretionary function exception to liability under Governmental Immunity Act
serves two policies: it shields those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large
numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseen
ways from individual and class legal actions,

the continual threat of which would make
public administration all but impossible, and
it preserves the autonomy of coordinate
branches of government. U.C.A.1953, 6330-3(1), 63-30-10,
6. Municipal Corporations <§=>728
Not every governmental action involving
discretion is a discretionary function within
the meaning of Governmental Immunity Act;
only those decisions arising out of a governmental entity's basic pohcymaking function
qualify for immunity under the discretionary
function exception. U.C JU953, 63-30-10(1).
7. Municipal Corporations @=>728
Governmental decisions that are the result of serious and extensive policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise in numerous
areas of concern qualify as immune "discretionary functions" under Governmental Immunity Act. U.CA1953, 63-30-10(1).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

8. Municipal Corporations @=>728
In contrast to governmental decisions
involving evaluation of broad policy factors,
acts, and decisions at the operational level
are not "discretionary functions" for purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act;
therefore, while the formulation of policy is
an immune discretionary function, the execution of already-formulated policies is not.
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10(1).
9. Municipal Corporations <&=>728
Allegations that a governmental entity
has been negligent must be separately examined to determine if each act complained of is
an immunized discretionary function or is
merely an operational or ministerial implementation of already-established policy.
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-30-10(1).
10. Municipal Corporations <®=*742(4)
Immunity under Governmental Immunity Act is an affirmative defense which governmental defendant bears the burden of
proving. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-3010(1).

754 Utah

986 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

11. Municipal Corporations <§=>728
If governmental defendant posits immunity to tort claim on an exercise of discretion,
it must make a showing that a conscious
balancing of risks and advantages took place.
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-30-10(1).
12. Courts ©=>97(6)
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of discretionary function exception in
Federal Tort Claims Act is not binding on
Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the
discretionary function exception in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. 28 U.S.C-A.
§§ 1346, 2671 et seq.; U.C.A.1953, 63-303(1), 63-30-10(1).
13. Municipal Corporations @=>728
Governmental entity that asserts immunity to tort claim under discretionary function exception must satisfy four-part test: (1)
challenged act, omission, or decision must
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective; (2) questioned act,
omission, or decision must be essential to
realization or accomplishment of that policy,
program, or objective; (3) act, omission, or
decision must require exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on part
of governmental agency involved; and (4)
agency involved must possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority
and duty to do or make the challenged act,
omission, or decision. U.C.A.1953, 63-303(1), 63-30-10(1).
14. Judgment <s=»181(33)
Applicability of discretionary function
exception to a tort claim against a governmental entity is a fact-intensive inquiry that,
by its very nature, is not particularly amenable to summary judgment. U.CJL1953, 6330-3(1), 63-30-10(1).
15. Automobiles <s=>278
Formulation of traffic control plan by
Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT)
in connection with resurfacing of interstate
highway, including decision to use barrels
rather than* concrete barriers to separate
traffic coming from opposing directions, was
not a discretionary function for purposes of
immunity in action by motorists injured in
head-on collision; traffic-control plan was for-

mulated by an unlicensed UDOT staff engineer who did not perform at policy-making
level, and UDOT failed to show that plan was
the subject of intense scrutiny and review.
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-30-8, 63-30-10(1).
16. Automobiles e=>277.1
Alleged negligence by Utah Department
of Transportation in connection with resurfacing project for interstate highway, in failing to reduce speed in construction zone as
called for in traffic control plan, failing to
investigate accidents, and failing to meaningfully consider corrective action in response to
letter from contractor raising safety concerns
about traffic control plan, did not enjoy immunity under the discretionary function exception to tort claims by motorists injured in
head-on collision; those alleged omissions involved operational decisions in the implementation of, or failure to implement, pre-established policy. U.CJL1953, 63-30-3(1), 6330-8, 63-30-10(1).
17. Judgment ®=>181(33)
Questions of fact existed as to whether
state-designed traffic control plan that was
executed by general contractor in connection
with resurfacing of interstate highway was
unreasonably dangerous, and as to whether
contractor negligently executed that plan,
precluding summary judgment for contractor
in negligence action by motorists who were
injured in head-on collision allegedly resulting from inadequate separation of traffic
from opposing directions.
18. Negligence <s=>1205(7)
A contractor has a duty to perform the
work required by its contract with that degree of care ordinarily possessed and exercised by other contractors doing the same or
similar work in the same locality.
19. Negligence <S=>1205(7)
Contractor is not liable if it has merely
carried out the plans, specifications, .and directions given it, since in that case the responsibility is assumed by the employer, at
least when the plans are not so obviously
dangerous that no reasonable person would
follow them.
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20. Judgment ®=>185.3(21)
Lack of evidence specifically describing
as unreasonably dangerous a state-designed
traffic control plan executed by contractor
during highway resurfacing project was inconsequential to determining contractor's potential liability, on its motion for summary
judgment, in action by motorists who were
injured in head-on collision; no witness could
properly give that opinion since it involved an
ultimate question for the jury.
21. Judgment ®=>185(5)
Trial courts must avoid weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling
on motions for summary judgment.
22. Judgment <s=>181(33)
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OPINION
ORME, Judge:
HI Alan and Sharon Trujillo appeal the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT) and Ball, Ball and
Brosamer, Inc. (Ball). The Trujillos were
injured in a traffic accident on a stretch of I 84 then under construction. The Trujillos
challenge the trial court's rulings that the
"discretionary function" variant of governmental immunity shields UDOT from liability
and that the general contractor. Ball, is not
liable to the Trujillos because it followed
plans and specifications that were not unreasonably dangerous. The Trujillos' points are
well-taken, and we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Juries are uniquely qualified to judge
[1] 1F2 Because they appeal from sumwhether conduct falls above or below the mary judgment against them, we state the
standard of reasonable conduct deemed to facts in the light most favorable to the Trujilhave been set by the community, and there- los. See Ledfors v. Emery County Sch.
fore issues of reasonableness and negligence Dist, 849 P.2d 1162,1162 (Utah 1993).
should not be decided on summary judgment
113 On September 24, 1995, the Trujillos
except when the applicable standard of care
were driving eastbound on a winding, twois fixed by law and reasonable minds could
lane stretch of 1-84 through Weber Canyon
reach but one conclusion as to the defenwhen a westbound pick-up truck veered into
dants negligence under the circumstances.
their lane and collided head-on with their
motor home. The Trujillos suffered serious
23. Negligence @=»1713
permanent injuries from the accident, and
Issue of proximate cause is a question of the driver of the pick-up died at the scene.
fact for the jury to determine in all but the
114 1-84 is normally a four-lane, divided
clearest cases.
highway. However, at the time of the accident, the two eastbound lanes on the stretch
of road where the accident occurred were
closed
for road resurfacing. Consequently,
Gary B. Ferguson, Williams& Hunt, Salt
both
directions
of traffic had been channeled
Lake City, for Appellants.
onto the two previously westbound lanes.
Mark J. Williams, Plant, Wallace, Chris- Diversion of both directions of traffic onto
tensen & Kanell and Stephen P. Horvat, two contiguous lanes is known as two-lane,
Anderson & Karrenberg, Salt Lake City, for two-way operations (TLTWO). The two
Appellee Utah Department of Transporta- lanes of the TLTWO were each ten to twelve
feet wide with only two feet between them.
tion.
Double yellow lines painted on the road surStephen G. Morgan and Joseph E. Min- face and hollow plastic barrels spaced at 100nock, Morgan, Meyer and Rice, Salt Lake foot intervals divided the traffic flowing in
City, for Appellee Ball, Ball & Brosamer. opposite directions.
115 Traffic in the construction zone had
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON, and
been redirected pursuant to a traffic control
ORME, JJ.
plan designed by UDOT and implemented by
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Ball. Plans for the entire 1-84 project were
drafted, formulated, and approved in a series
of meetings and reviews over the course of
approximately one year. Participants included Federal Highway Administration representatives; UDOT maintenance, engineering,
design, and administrative personnel; and
several city and county officials. However,
although deposition testimony indicates that
two UDOT engineers discussed the traffic
control plan's separation of the two lanes, the
record contains no evidence that the traffic
control plan was ever specifically singled out
for discussion, review, or approval at any
point in the approval process.
116 As general contractor, Ball was contractually responsible for supervision of traffic control in the construction zone. Ball's
contract with UDOT .also required it to propose an alternate traffic control plan if it
found UDOT's plan to be unsafe or inadequate. Shortly after construction on the project began and four months before the Trujillos' accident, Ball's project manager, Shankar
Narayanan, wrote to Larry Durrant, UDOT's
project engineer, expressing his concern that
UDOT's traffic control plan was inadequate.
The letter stated in part:
This letter is to reiterate our concerns with
regard to UDOT's less than adequate traffic control design for this project. In particular we feel that the use of drums at
100' spacing to delineate opposing traffic in
an Interstate highway is hazardous to the
travelling public resulting in increasing the
chances of accidents.

11 8 About one year after the September
1995 accident, the Trujillos filed suit against
UDOT and Ball in Third District Court. The
Trujillos alleged that UDOT and Ball were
negligent in the design, supervision, and implementation of the traffic control plan for
the 1-84 resurfacing project. Specifically,
the Trujillos alleged that UDOT and Ball
negligently failed to install concrete barriers
to prevent crossover accidents in the area
where the Trujillos' accident took place.
K 9 UDOT and Ball moved for summary
judgment, arguing they owed no duty of care
to protect the Trujillos from crossover accidents. UDOT also argued that governmental immunity shielded it from tort liability.
The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of both defendants, reasoning that
"the decision made by UDOT in planning and
designing the 1-84 resurfacing project, which
included a Traffic Control Plan utilizing barrels to separate [traffic in the TLTWO] was a
discretionary act which created immunity for
UDOT under the discretionary function exception to the Governmental Immunity Act."
The court further ruled that '"in carrying out
the plans and specifications for 1-84 drafted
by UDOT, [Ball] acted in accordance with the
plans and specifications, which were not so
unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable
contractor would not perform and carry out
said plans and specifications."
1110 The Trujillos timely appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court, which transferred the
matter to this court as permitted by Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).

11 7 Five days later, Durrant answered the
letter, stating that "[i]f [Ball] feels UDOT's
traffic control plans are inadequate, then as
outlined [in the contract], the traffic control
supervisor's responsibility is to prepare and
submit revisions to the traffic control plans
for the subject project." Narayanan testified
in his deposition that he and Durrant discussed possible options for addressing his
concerns, including the use of concrete barriers. However, it is undisputed that no aspect of the traffic control plan was altered.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Ull The Trujillos raise two issues on appeal. First, the Trujillos argue the trial
court erred when it concluded that governmental immunity shields UDOT from liability
for alleged negligence in planning and designing the 1-84 resurfacing project, including formulating the traffic control plan, and
in ruling that design of the project was a
discretionary function under a provision of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1997).1 Second,

1. As a convenience to the reader, and because
the provisions in effect at the relevant times do
not differ materially from the statutory provi-

sions currently in effect, we cite to the most
recent statutory codifications throughout this
opinion, unless otherwise noted.
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the Trujillos challenge the trial court's conclusions that, as a matter of law, the traffic
control plan designed by UDOT was not
unreasonably dangerous and that Ball was
therefore not negligent in implementing it.

suit for any injury which results from the
exercise of a governmental function[.]" Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1997). "Governmental function" is broadly defined as "any
act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking of a governmental entity." Id.
[2] 1f 12 "Summary judgment is proper
§ 63-30-2(4)(a) (1997). Cf. Keegan v. State,
only when there are no genuine issues of
896 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1995) ("[T]he test for
material fact and the moving party is entitled
determining whether the activity undertaken
to judgment as a matter of law." Taylor u
is a governmental function focuses on whethOgden Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah
er that activity 'is of such a unique nature
1996). We review the trial court's conclusion
that it can only be performed by a governthat the parties raised no genuine issues of
mental agency or that it is essential to the
material fact, and its application of the govcore of governmental activity.'") (quoting
erning law, for correctness. See Nelson v. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1230,1236-37 (Utah 1980)).
1996). As we analyze the issues, we are
1116 Scattered sections of the Act waive
mindfiil that, "because negligence cases often
require the drawing of inferences from the immunity under particular circumstances.
facts, which is properly done by juries rather Thus, the Act permits claims against governthan judges, 'summary judgment is appropri- mental entities that involve contract obliate in negligence cases only in the clearest gations, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5
instances.'" Id. (quoting Dwiggins v. Mor- (1997); property, see id. §§ 63-30-6, -10.5;
gan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991)). defective public buildings and improvements,
see id. § 63-30-9; and negligent acts and
omissions
of public employees. See id. § 63DISCRETIONAKY FUNCTION
30-10.
The
Act specifically waives immunity
IMMUNITY
for injuries caused by dangerous or defective
[3] 1113 Sovereign immunity, rooted in highways. See id. § 63-30-8. When immuthe medieval British notion that the King nity is waived, the "liability of the [governcould do no wrong, precludes lawsuits mental] entity [is] determined as if the entity
against governmental entities without the were a private person." Id. § 63-30-4(l)(b).
government's consent. See Brittain v. State,
1117 For certain kinds of claims, however,
882 P.2d 666, 668-69 (Utah Ct.App.1994).
such waivers of immunity are restricted by a
number of exceptions. See Utah Code Ann.
A. Statutory Immunity Scheme
§ 63-30-10 (1997). Thus, although the Act
H14 In 1965, the Utah Legislature passed waives immunity for liability from injuries
the Governmental Immunity Act, codifying caused by defective conditions of public
the sovereign immunity doctrine in Utah. See buildings and highways, and by the negliDeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah gence of public employees, immunity is re1995) (citing 1965 Utah Laws 390, ch. 139, tained "if the injury ar[ose] out of, in connec§ 3). The Act first grants general immunity tion with, or result[ed] from" one of nineteen
from suit to governmental entities, then nar- enumerated circumstances. Id, For examrows that general grant by waiving immunity ple, immunity is retained if an injury resulted
for certain claims, and finally broadens im- from a failure to revoke a permit, see id.
munity again with exceptions to the waivers § 63-30-10(3), or make an inspection. See
that result in retaining immunity under cer- id. § 63-30-10(4). Immunity is also retained
tain circumstances. See Hansen v. Salt Lake with respect to injuries caused by natural
County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah 1990).
conditions on public land. See id § 63-301115 Section 63-30-3(1) of the Act confers 10(11). Of particular significance in this apthe general grant of immunity: "Except as peal, immunity is retained for injuries that
may be otherwise provided in this chapter, arise out of "the exercise or performance or
all governmental entities are immune from the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
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tionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused." Id. § 63-30-10(1).
[4] 1118 To determine whether the trial
court correctly ruled that the Governmental
Immunity Act bars the Trujillos from proceeding with their negligence claims against
UDOT, we follow the three-step analysis established by the Utah Supreme Court. See
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 619-20; Ledfors v. Emery County Sck Dist, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164
(Utah 1993). Tracking the logic of the Act,
the established analysis addresses three issues. Applied to the facts of this case, they
are, first, whether the design of the traffic
control plan for the 1-84 resurfacing project
was a governmental function to which section
63-30-3(l)'s general grant of immunity applies, see Keegan, 896 P.2d at 619-20; second, if the design of the traffic control plan is
a governmental function, whether the Act
waives immunity for injuries arising out of
the particular governmental function at issue,
see id.; and finally, even if immunity is otherwise waived, whether an exception applies
that retains immunity for the exercise of that
governmental function. See id.
H19 The parties agree that UDOT's construction of 1-84 is a governmental function
and, thus, that the Governmental Immunity
Act applies to the Trujillos' claims against
UDOT. Likewise, the parties agree that "immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8
(1997). Here, however, agreement between
the parties ends. Their disagreement centers on the final prong of the three-part test:
whether, even though section 63-30-8's waiver appears to permit the Trujillos to pursue
their claims against UDOT for injuries they
allege were caused by a defective, unsafe, or
dangerous condition of 1-84, an exception
specified in the Act nevertheless bars the
Trujillos5 action, UDOT argues the trial
court correctly concluded that the "discretionary function" exception does just that
[5] 1120 Section 63-30-10 provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately

caused by a negligent act or omission of ai
employee committed within the scope o
employment except if the injury arises ou
of, in connection with, or results from
(1) the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discre
tionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused
Id. § 63-30-10. Utah precedent interpreting
and applying the discretionary function exception has articulated two policies served b}
the exception. First, the discretionary function exception "' "shield[s] those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large
numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseen
ways from individual and class legal actions,
the continual threat of which would make
public administration all but impossible." *"
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (citations omitted).
Second, the exception preserves the autonomy of coordinate branches of government.
To that end, " *[w]here the responsibility for
basic policy decisions has been committed to
one of the branches of our tri-partite system
of government, the courts have refrained
from sitting in judgment of the propriety of
those decisions.'" Id. (quoting Little v. Utah
State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51
(Utah 1983)).
B. Policy-making Versus Operations
[6] 1121 Discretionary function immunity
has been interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the policies it was intended to promote. Thus, the Utah Supreme
Court has recently stated that, in comparison
to the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, discretionary function immunity is "a distinct, more limited form of immunity [that]
should be applied only when a plaintiff is
challenging a governmental decision that involves a basic policy-making function." Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575
(Utah 1996). Not every governmental action
involving discretion is a discretionary function within the meaning of the Act. See Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980).
Were it otherwise, the exception would swallow the rule, as almost all governmental decisions involve some discretion. See Nelson,
919 P.2d at 575; Bigelow, 618 P.2d at 53.
Consequently, only those decisions arising
out of a governmental entity's basic policy-
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making function qualify for immunity under
the discretionary function exception. See
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623.
[7] 1122 "Although the term 'discretionary function' is not susceptible to precise
definition in all legal contexts," Nelson, 919
P.2d at 575, case law interpreting discretionary function immunity 'has stated that
" '[cfliscretionary acts are those "characterized by a high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing alternatives and
making choices with respect to public policy
and planning."'" Keegan, 896 P.2d at 625
(citations omitted). Governmental decisions
that are "' "the result of serious and extensive policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise in numerous areas of concern"' " qualifyas immune discretionary functions. Id. (citations omitted).
[8,9] 1f23 In contrast to governmental
decisions involving evaluation of broad policy
factors, "acts and decisions at the operational
level—those everyday, routine matters"—are
not discretionary functions. Nelson, 919
P.2d at 575. Therefore, while the formulation of policy is an immune discretionary
function, "the execution of already-formulated policies" is not. Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623.
Allegations that a governmental entity has
been negligent must be separately examined
to determine if each act complained of is an
immunized discretionary function or is merely an operational or ministerial implementation of already-established policy. See Hansen, 794 P.2d at 846; Doe v. ArgueUes, 716
P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 1985). See also Rocky
Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. u Salt Lake
City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 463-64 (Utah 1989)
(analyzing separately each allegation of negligence under exception retaining immunity
for negligent failure to inspect or inadequate
inspection).

tal, financial, and urban planning and developmental concerns, and financial concerns."
Rocky Mountain Thrift, 784 P.2d at 463.
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held
that the process by which UDOT determines
when railroad crossing warnings will be upgraded is a discretionary function. See Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835
(Utah 1992). Finally, our Supreme Court
recently held that it was an act of discretion
for UDOT to decide not to replace a concrete
barrier when, after two road surface overlays, it no longer reached the height required by safety standards. See Keegan, 896
P.2d at 619, 626. The Court held that "the
determination of whether to raise the concrete median barrier was a decision inherently bound up in economic, political, and
safety considerations, as indicated by [the
UDOT safety engineer's] safety study report
and [the UDOT project design engineer's]
cost-benefits report." Id. at 625.
1125 In contrast, the Court has ruled that
the State was not immune from suit for
injuries caused by an allegedly dangerous
traffic control system because, "[although
the acts of the State . . . in designing the
traffic control system involve some degree of
discretion, as do almost all acts, the design of
the traffic control system does not involve
the *basic policy making level.'" Bigelow,
618 P.2d at 53. Similarly, in Andrus v. State,
541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), our Supreme
Court held that "[t]he decision to build [a]
highway and specifying its general location
were discretionary functions, but the preparing of plans and specifications and the supervision of the manner in which the work was
carried out cannot be labeled discretionary
functions." Id at 1120. Thus, the Court
held that the State enjoyed no immunity
from suit for water damage to property allegedly arising out of the design and specifications for construction of a highway. See
id.

1124 Guided by these distinctions, prior
case law has held, for example, that "[decisions made by [Salt Lake City] regarding
U26 Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court
the design, capacity, and construction of
their flood control systems" were immunized held in Carroll v. State ex rel. Road Comm'n,
under the discretionary function exception 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972), that
because the decisions were "the result of ser- "the decision of the road supervisor to use
ious and extensive policy evaluation, judg- berms as the sole means of protection for the
ment, and expertise in numerous areas of unwary traveler [proceeding onto a closed
concern[, including] geological, environmen- road] was not a basic policy decision essential
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to the realization or accomplishment of some cise of discretion, it must make a showing
basic governmental policy, program, or ob- that a conscious balancing of risks and adjective," but was merely a determination vantages took place."2 Little, 667 P.2d at
made at the operational level. 496 P.2d at 51. Accordingly, to successfully bear its bur891-92. See also Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76 den of proving immunity from suit for the
(holding that failure of governmental entity Trujillos> injuries, UDOT must show that
to repair breach in fence through which child each act of alleged negligence qualifies as -a
gained access to river was not immune dis- discretionary function under the following
cretionary function); Arguelles, 716 P.2d at four-part test:
283 (holding that decision to return juvenile
"(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or
offender to community was immunized disdecision necessarily involve a basic governcretionary function, but alleged negligence in
mental
policy, program, or objective? (2)
monitoring juvenile's treatment after release
Is
the
questioned
act, omission, or decision
was not similarly immune); Little v. Utah
essential to the realization or accomplishState Din of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51ment of that policy, program, or objective
52 (Utah 1983) (holding that, even if decision
as opposed to one which would not change
to place high-need child in foster home was
immune discretionary function, alleged failthe course or direction of the policy, proure of Family Services to evaluate foster
gram, or objective? (3) Does the act,
home, supervise placement, and protect child
omission, or decision require the exercise
from harm was actionable).
of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and
expertise
on the part of the governmental
[10-13] H27 Immunity is an affirmative
agency involved? (4) Does the governmendefense which the defendant bears the burtal agency involved possess the requisite
den of proving. See Nelson, 919 P.2d at 574.
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authoriIf UDOT "posits immunity on . . . an exer2. We note that the United States Supreme Court,
in interpreting a similar discretionary function
exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act, has not
required such a showing. See United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325, 111 S.Ct 1267,
1275, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (holding that, under FTCA, "[discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level," and "acts
of agency employees in executing [a] program"
are also discretionary). Of course, this analytic
approach is not binding on our interpretation of
the discretionary function exception in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, and the analysis
consistentiy employed by the Utah Supreme
Court is to the contrary.
In Carroll v. State ex rel. Road Commission, 27
Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972), one of the
earliest Utah cases interpreting the discretionary
function exception, our Supreme Court recognized that the discretionary function exception in
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act was patterned after a similar provision in the Federal
Tort Claims Act. See 27 Utah 2d at 388, 496 P.2d
at 891. Later, in Little v. Utah State Division of
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), the
Court cited federal case law in support of the
policy-versus-operations distinction first 'announced in Carroll See Little, 667 P.2d at 51
("[T]he lines in federal cases have been consistently drawn between those functions ascribable
to the policy making level and those to the operational level [.]") (citing Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953);
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61,

76 S.Ct 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955)). More recently, the United States Supreme Court, in United
States v. Gaubert, referred to the policy-versusoperations distinction as a misinterpretation of
its earlier cases. See 499 U.S. at 326, 111 S.Ct.
at 1275 ("[T]he distinction in Dalehite was merely description of the level at which the challenged conduct occurred. There was no suggestion that decisions made at an operational level
could not also be based on policy.").
We recognize that the Keegan court cited a
Fourth Circuit case that followed Gaubert's abrogation of the policy/operational distinction.
See Bourn v. United States, 986 F.2d 716 (4th
Cir.1993). The Keegan court quoted Bourn for
the proposition that, "to determine whether a
certain decision involved the exercise of a discretionary function, courts must 'look to the nature
of the challenged decision in an objective, or
general sense, and ask whether the decision is
one which we would expect inherently to be
grounded in considerations of policy.' " Keegan,
896 P.2d at 625 (quoting Bourn, 986 F.2d at 721).
However, because Keegan applied the Little test
and relied on evidence that the decisions there at
issue were in fact made on the policy level after
careful study and deliberation, we do not consider Keegan to have appreciably detracted from the
validity of the long-standing policy-versus-operational analysis, which requires evidence that "a
conscious balancing of risks and advantages took
place" regarding each allegedly negligent act.
Little, 667 P.2d at 51.

TRUJILLO r. UTAH DEPT. OF TRANSP.

Utah 761

Cite as 986 P.2d 752 (UtahApp. 1999)

ty and duty to do or make the challenged
act, omission, or decision?"
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (quoting Little, 667
P.2d at 51).
[14] 1128 This is a fact-intensive inquiry
that, by its very nature, is not particularly
amenable to summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Hansen, 794 P.2d at 846 (reversing summary
judgment of immunity and remanding for
further factual development regarding
whether decision was one of policy or operation); Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, 784
P.2d at 464 (same). But see Duncan, 842
P.2d at 836 (affirming summary judgment for
State on immunity grounds).

Keegan provides an illustrative contrast. In
that case, our Supreme Court detailed the
process by which UDOT decided not to replace a concrete barrier even though it knew
planned surface overlays would reduce its
height below required safety standards. The
Supreme Court noted that, before the second
surface overlay, a UDOT safety studies engineer "carried out a comprehensive study of
accident rates" from which he created a safety study report. Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624.
The report concluded that safety would not
be adversely affected if the barrier were not
replaced during the second overlay. See id.
Also before the second resurfacing, a UDOT
project design engineer prepared a cost-ben,
efit report using information from the safety
C. Analysis of Trujillos Claims
study report. See id. The cost-benefit re1t 29 The Trujfflos charge UDOT with five
port considered factors such, as
separate acts of negligence. The Trujillos
the cost of removing and replacing the
allege UDOT negligently (1> designed and
barrier,
the already-scheduled' major reimplemented an unsafe traffic control plan
surfacing
project for 1-80 in five or six
for the 1-84 resurfacing project; (2) used
years, the added delays and inconvenience
hollow plastic barrels rather than concrete
to users of the highway if the barrier were
barriers to separate traffic in the constructo be dug up and replaced, and the possition zone; (3) failed to reduce the speed limit
bility that the job could not be completed
in the construction zone as directed by the
inexpensively and with minimal disruption
traffic control plan; (4) failed to investigate
to
traffic during the short construction seaother accidents that had occurred in the con,
son
in the canyon.
struction zone prior to the Trujiilos accident
and to make appropriate adjustments in traf- Id. This study and report were conducted
fic control to reduce the risk of future acci- and compiled "by senior engineers and circudents; and (5) failed to alter traffic control lated throughout and debated within the detechniques in response to the concerns of partment" Id After parsing the particulars
Ball's project manager, Mr. Narayanan. of the decision-making process, the Court
While we believe UDOTs basic decision to concluded that "UDOT's decision involved
undertake the 1-84 resurfacing project nec- just the sort of policy-driven weighing of
essarily would be considered an immune dis- costs and benefits that the discretionary
cretionary function, we hold, on the record function exception was meant to protect."
before us, that the discretionary function ex- Id.
ception does not immunize UDOT from the
1f 31 In this appeal, on the other hand, it is
daims the Trujillos have raised.
undisputed that the traffic control plan was
[15] 130 We first consider the Trujillos' formulated by an unlicensed UDOT staff enclaim that UDOT negligently designed an gineer—an employee who did not perform at
inadequate traffic control plan for the 1-84 the policy-making level. Further, while the
resurfacing project. We hold that the record record on appeal contains a general descripon appeal does not support the trial court's tion of the multi-level approval process for
conclusion that the design of the traffic con- plans and specifications pertaining to the Itrol plan and its preference for barrels over 84 resurfacing project, UDOT's evidence
barriers was made at the immunized policy- does no more than establish the traffic conmaking level. The evidence presented by trol plan could have been discussed in these
UDOT falls short of the standards set forth meetings. UDOT does not point us to eviin prior Utah Supreme Court precedent. dence that the traffic control plan and the
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barrels-versus-barriers decision was in fact
the subject of intense scrutiny and review.
UDOT now characterizes the decision to use
barrels as a "tough choice" between two traffic separation methods and draws our attention to the relative risks and benefits of
barrels and barriers. However, UDOT's evidence shows these issues were addressed
only in private discussions between the project design engineer who drafted the traffic
control plan and UDOT's Region One Design
Engineer. These facts are insufficient to
bring the formulation of the traffic control
plan within the scope of discretionary function immunity.
1132 Similarly, the Trujillos presented evidence to the trial court that the Manual of
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD),
adopted by UDOT, listed particular "industry
standard" factors to be considered before
implementing TLTWO, specifically to guard
against head-on collisions. The Trujillos presented additional evidence that an Occupational Safety Report for the stretch of 1-84
involved in the resurfacing project was available, and, if consulted by UDOT, would have
shown that accidents in the construction zone
clustered around the area where the Trujillos' accident took place. Nevertheless, while
the Occupational Safety Report and evidence
of traffic-volume reports appear in the record, UDOT presented no documentary or
testimonial evidence that either the MUTCD
factors, the Occupational Safety Report, or
the traffic volume reports were discussed in
the course of approving the traffic control
plan.3
1133 UDOT argues the Governmental Immunity Act does not require it to consult
written studies or to prove that specific issues were addressed during the decisionmaking process. UDOT contends the holding of Keegan is that decisions regarding
3. Whether due to the Occupational Safety Report
or on some other basis, UDOT did see fit to
require concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels to protect the construction crews working on
the shoulder of the highway from traffic.
4. Mr. Durrant's letter responding to Mr. Narayanan's concern is perhaps more interesting for
what it does not say than for what it does say. If
indeed the traffic control plan had been the result of the kind of policy analysis the discretionary function exception contemplates, we might

highway median design and lane separation
are inherently discretionary functions. We
disagree. Utah cases interpreting the discretionary function exception, including Keegan, have focused on the process by which
decisions of governmental entities are made.
Under Utah precedent, we cannot assume
UDOT's traffic control plan was the product
of the exercise of policy-level discretion simply because it dealt with highway median
design. UDOT proffered no evidence that
the formulation of the traffic control plan and
the decision to separate opposing lanes of
traffic with hollow plastic barrels were
" l "the result of serious and extensive policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise in numerous areas of concern."'" Keegan, 896
P2d at 625 (citations omitted). On the record before us, therefore, we hold that
UDOT's formulation of the traffic control
plan and its decision to use barrels rather
than barriers have not been shown to rise to
the immunized policy-making level.
[16] H 34 We next consider the negligent
acts UDOT allegedly committed after the
traffic control plan was in effect in the construction zone. We hold that these remaining allegations of negligence involve operational decisions on the part of UDOT, which
implemented or failed to implement pre-established policy. See Nelson, 919 P.2d at
575-76; Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623. Specifically, we hold that failure to reduce speed in the
construction zone as called for in the plan,
failure to investigate accidents, and failure to
meaningfully consider corrective action in response to Mr. Narayanan's letter 4 all are
"acts and decisions at the operational level—
those every day, routine matters" that do no4t
enjoy immunity under the discretionary function exception. Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575.
expect Mr. Durrant to have responded that, as a
matter of policy, UDOT had determined that the
traffic control plan, as written, adequately balanced competing concerns, such as safety and
cost, and, because it was the product of extensive
policy evaluation, it could not casually be altered. This, however, was not the tenor of his
reply. Instead, he merely invited Mr. Narayanan
to propose an alternative plan if he were so
concerned.
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hnmunity shields it from liability. The Tru1135 The acts and omissions of which the
jillos' evidence, both as to the formulation
rujillos complain are analogous to those adand execution of the traffic control plan, reressed in Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279,
futes UDOT's contention that the relevant
83 (Utah 1985), in .which the Utah Supreme
decisions were made at the policy level rathlourt ruled that the State did not enjoy
er than at the operational level.
nmunity when a juvenile with a history of
exual violence assaulted a young girl while
e was in a community placement while in
LIABILITY OF BALL
Itate custody. See id. The Court recog[17-19] H 39 We now consider Ball's poized that the decision to place the juvenile
tential
liability to the Trujillos. A contractor
ffender in the community was an immune
has
a
duty
to "perform the work required by
Iiscretionary decision made by the superinits
contract
... with that degree of care
endent of the Youth Detention Center. See
d. The Court ruled, however, that the fail- ordinarily possessed and exercised by other
ire of the superintendent to ensure that the contractors doing the same or similar work
jffender received proper therapy, which had in'[the same] locality." Andrus v. State, 541
)een prescribed by the superintendent him- P2d 1117, 1121 (Utah 1975). However, a
jelf, was actionable because it concerned the "contractor is not liable if [it] has merely
nanner in which the superintendent imple- carried out the plans, specifications and dinented policy and not the policy itself. See rections given [it], since'in that case the
id
responsibility is assumed by the employer, at
1136 The Trujillos presented unrebutted least when the plans are not so obviously
evidence that the speed limit in the construc- dangerous that no reasonable [person] would
tion zone remained at 65 miles per hour follow them." Leininger v. Stearns-Roger
despite the fact that the traffic control plan Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 41,-404 V2d 33, 36
called for the speed limit to be reduced to 50 (1965) (emphasis added). It follows that Ball
m.p.h. The Trujillos presented additional evi- can be held liable for„the Trujillos' damages
dence that although two crossover accidents if, as the Trujillos allege, it negligently perhad occurred in the construction zone before formed its responsibilities under its contract
the Trujillos' accident, TJDOT had not inves- with UDOT or, if the traffic control plan was
tigated or analyzed either of them even so dangerous that a reasonable person would
though the traffic control plan.mandated that have refused to follow it.
accidents in the construction zone be investigated and analyzed.
[20] H 40 First, regarding their allegation
1137 These alleged omissions occurred af- that UDOT's traffic control plan was so unter the allegedly unsafe and inadequate traf- reasonably dangerous that Ball should have
fic control plan was adopted. Therefore, to refused to implement it, the Trujillos preecho the Court's conclusion in Doe v. Arg- sented expert testimony that the plan failed
uelles, even if the formulation of the plan was to comply with MUTCD.5 Moreover, the
an immune discretionary function, immunity Trujillos allege that the letter from Ball's
would not extend so far as to protect UDOT project manager, Mr. Narayanan, to UDOT's
from liability for negligently executing the Larry Durrant shows that Ball was aware
plan.
that separating opposing traffic with hollow
plastic barrels posed an unreasonable danger
D. Conclusion
to travelers on 1-84. In the letter, Mr. Na1 38 On the record before us, UDOT has
rayanan first voiced a concern over the methnot demonstrated1 that discretionary function
5. Ball makes much of the fact that no evidence
directly states that the traffic control plan was
unreasonably dangerous. We note, however,
that no witness couLd properly give that opinion
because it is an ultimate question to be determined by the jury. The absence of evidence
specifically describing the plan as unreasonably

dangerous is, therefore, inconsequential. See
Gaw v. Statt ex rel. Dep't of Tramp., 798 E.2d
1130, 1137 & n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (in summary judgment context, expert witness affidavits
must not contain merely concLusory statements),
cert, denied, unpublished order of Utah Supreme
Court (Jan. 11, 1991).
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od of separation and then tried to disclaim
liability, stating that Ball "will implement the
traffic control as shown on the plans and
specification^], however we will not be in a
position to accept liability on accidents due to
the conditions mentioned above." Five days
later, Mr. Durrant responded, informing Mr.
Narayanan that "[i]f Ball . . . feels UDOT's
traffic control plans are inadequate, then as
outlined [in the contract], the traffic control
supervisor's responsibility is to prepare and
submit revisions to the traffic control plans
for the subject project." Although Mr. Narayanan testified that he and Mr. Durrant
discussed and resolved his concerns, Mr.
Durrant did not recall any such conversation,
and the plan was never revised. Thus, we
conclude the evidence presented by the Trujillos is sufficient to create a material question of fact about whether the traffic control
plan was unreasonably dangerous and whether Ball negligently failed to propose safer
alternatives, as required by its contract with
UDOT.
1f 41 The Trujillos further allege Ball was
negligent in failing to reduce the speed limit
in the construction zone, keep an accident
log, and investigate accidents that occurred
in the construction zone, as required by the
traffic control plan. Ball was responsible for
traffic control in the construction zone, a
responsibility it carried out in part through
supervision and implementation of the traffic
control plan. Nonetheless, although the traffic control plan called for a 50 m.p.h. speed
limit through the construction zone, the
speed limit remained at 65 m.p.h. Similarly,
although the plan required Ball to include
accident information in its project log, Ball
failed to investigate the two accidents that
occurred in the construction zone prior to the
Trujillos' accident. These alleged acts of
negligence, if proven, constitute negligent
performance of Ball's duties under its contract with UDOT. Ball obviously cannot avail
itself of the defense that it is not liable
because it merely followed the plans and
specifications provided by UDOT if in fact it
failed to comply with the specifications of the
traffic control plan. Ball, therefore, can be
held liable for its negligent noncompliance
with the plan whether or not the traffic

control plan itself is found to be unreasonably dangerous.
[21-23] 1142 These are questions of fact a
jury must decide. Trial courts must avoid
weighing evidence and assessing credibility
when ruling on motions for summary judgment. See Dubois v. Grand Central, 872
P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Moreover, "it is peculiarly fitting that [a jury
should] determine" whether the conduct of
Ball comported with " 'ordinary, reasonable
care under the circumstances.'" Cornfield v.
Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah
Ct.App.1992) (quoting DeWeese u J.C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 121, 297 P.2d 898,
901 (1956)), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993). Juries are uniquely qualified to judge
whether conduct " 'falls above or below the
standard of reasonable conduct deemed to
have been set by the community.'" Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 459 n. 4 (Utah
CtA.pp.1991) (citations omitted). Issues of
reasonableness and negligence, therefore,
should not be decided on summary judgment
except when " t h e applicable standard of
care is "fixed by law," and reasonable minds
could reach but one conclusion as to the
defendant's negligence under the circumstances.' " Id. at 459 (citations omitted).
Likewise, the issue of proximate cause is a
question of fact for the jury to determine in
all but the clearest cases. See Nelson ex rel
Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568,
574 (Utah 1996).

CONCLUSION
1143 UDOT failed to prove, as a matter of
law, that it was immune from liability to the
Trujillos under the discretionary function
doctrine, and questions of material fact permeate the issue of Ball's potential liability to
the Trujillos. Accordingly, we reverse the
summary judgment in favor of UDOT and
Ball and remand to the trial court for trial or
such other proceedings as may now be appropriate.
1144 I CONCUR: NORMAN H.
JACKSON, Judge.

